The Bretton Woods system

It was clear during the Second World War that a new international system would be needed to replace the Gold Standard after the war ended. The design for it was drawn up at the Bretton Woods Conference in the US in 1944. US political and economic dominance necessitated the dollar being at the centre of the system. After the chaos of the inter-war period there was a desire for stability, with fixed exchange rates seen as essential for trade, but also for more flexibility than the traditional Gold Standard had provided. The system drawn up fixed the dollar to gold at the existing parity of US$35 per ounce, while all other currencies had fixed, but adjustable, exchange rates to the dollar. Unlike the classical Gold Standard, capital controls were permitted to enable governments to stimulate their economies without suffering from financial market penalties.

During the Bretton Woods era the world economy grew rapidly. Keynesian economic policies enabled governments to dampen economic fluctuations, and recessions were generally minor. However strains started to show in the 1960s. Persistent, albeit low-level, global inflation made the price of gold too low in real terms. A chronic US trade deficit drained US gold reserves, but there was considerable resistance to the idea of devaluing the dollar against gold; in any event this would have required agreement among surplus countries to raise their exchange rates against the dollar to bring about the needed adjustment. Meanwhile, the pace of economic growth meant that the level of international reserves generally became inadequate; the invention of the ‘Special Drawing Right’ (SDR) 1 failed to solve this problem. While capital controls still remained, they were considerably weaker by the end of the 1960s than in the early 1950s, raising prospects of capital flight from, or speculation against, currencies that were perceived as weak.

In 1961 the London Gold Pool was formed. Eight nations pooled their gold reserves to defend the US$35 per ounce peg and prevent the price of gold moving upwards. This worked for a while, but strains started to emerge. In March 1968, a two-tier gold market was introduced with a freely floating private market, and official transactions at the fixed parity. The two-tier system was inherently fragile. The problem of the US deficit remained and intensified. With speculation against the dollar intensifying, other central banks became increasingly reluctant to accept dollars in settlement; the situation became untenable. Finally in August 1971, President Nixon announced that the US would end on-demand convertibility of the dollar into gold for the central banks of other nations. The Bretton Woods system collapsed and gold traded freely on the world’s markets.

1 A new reserve asset, the SDR was created and given the value of 0.888571 gram of fine gold, the same value as the dollar in July 1944.

https://www.gold.org/history-and-facts/gold-money

What were the perceived advantages and disadvantages of the Gold Standard?

In the 19th century after the Napoleonic Wars, societies turned initially to gold, silver or bimetallic standards, and subsequently to the international Gold Standard, in order to reduce the potential for run-away inflation. Throughout history, and with some notable episodes in the 18th century and around 1800 during periods when money was not tied tightly to gold or silver, governments or central banks often printed too much currency, increasing the money supply too fast—reducing the effective value of the currency. By tying paper currency to gold, society linked the ability of a central bank to print money to the amount of gold that it had in its possession or to a multiple thereof. This provided tremendous confidence in the currency; citizens knew that at any point they could redeem their paper currency for gold. Thus, the primary advantage that has been attributed to the Gold Standard is price stability - which provides the conditions for greater economic activity and broader financial stability. During the Gold Standard, prices both rose and fell, but over the long-term they were broadly stable1.

There is also plenty of evidence that cross-border investment flows during the Gold Standard period were substantial2. Confidence that exchange rates would hold facilitated the substantial flows of direct investment that opened up the ‘emerging markets’ of the era, such as the Americas (including the US West), Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Global outflows of capital from the core European countries to countries of new settlement were massive during this era and far higher than during most of the 20th century. Only towards the end of the 20th century did international capital flows recover to comparable levels. Arguably, today they are often less stable than during the Gold Standard period (witness the ‘Asian crisis’ of 1997-98) and can be in the ‘wrong’ direction from emerging markets to developed ones.

Indeed the period of the Gold Standard was a highly successful one for the world economy. World trade expanded and most countries benefited from relatively rapid growth and low instability. Experts debate to what extent the Gold Standard enabled this and to what extent it flourished, because of these favourable conditions. Most probably causality flowed in both directions, but it would be hard to deny that the Gold Standard at least helped to facilitate matters.

On the other hand, a major disadvantage of the Gold Standard was that it did not allow policy makers to stimulate the economy through a monetary stimulus —which is the foundation of modern-day Keynesian economics. Furthermore, by tying a nation’s currency to gold, the money supply is instead tied to the global stock of monetary gold, growth in which varies, in particular, with the pace of new mine supply. Thus large discoveries of gold can have the effect of creating a monetary stimulus—which might not be appropriate at that particular time. Conversely, lower growth in gold output during a particular period can limit the expansion of the monetary base, restraining economic growth. Following the Californian and Australian gold discoveries of the late 1840s and the 1850s, there was rapid growth in mine production. This first levelled off and then fell back in the 1870s and 1880s, before surging again with the South African and Klondike discoveries of the 1890s, and improved production techniques.

Further, while the overall picture is one of rising prosperity, there were times of hardship in all countries. The Gold Standard was famously blamed for economic problems in the US. Discontent culminated in William Jennings Bryan’s famous ‘cross of gold’ speech in the 1896 presidential election campaign3. Nevertheless it is not just under a Gold Standard that tensions arise between the desire or need to maintain a fixed exchange rate and the desire to mitigate its adverse impacts on the domestic economy. The history of currency boards and, indeed, the Eurozone crisis of 2010-11 are other examples.

Why did the Gold Standard break down?

The Gold Standard broke down at the outset of the First World War, as countries resorted to inflationary policies to finance the war and, later, reconstruction efforts. In practice, only the US remained on the standard during the war. The reputation of the Gold Standard meant that there was a widespread desire to return to gold afterwards. However, differing inflationary experiences during and after the war – including the German hyperinflation of 1922-24 – meant that a return to pre-war parities was not automatically feasible. A further problem was concern, in the absence of major new gold discoveries after the 1890s, over whether there would be sufficient gold to underpin the standard. These concerns had started to surface in the first decade of the 20th century. The solution was to allow the emergence of a ‘gold exchange standard’ whereby central banks both acquired a higher proportion of the gold stock4, reducing the amount of gold coins in domestic circulation, and also started to hold increasing amounts of their reserves in the form of foreign currency assets, primarily sterling or dollars. On this basis, most countries, with China and the Soviet Union being notable exceptions, returned to a Gold Standard during the 1920s.

But many countries returned at the ‘wrong’ gold price/exchange rate. The UK, for example, returned at its pre- war rate. But a decline in UK competitiveness meant that sterling was now heavily overvalued. France, by contrast, having experienced higher inflation than the UK, returned at a different parity giving itself an undervalued exchange rate. The US did not change its parity but having experienced lower inflation than most countries this also resulted in an effective undervalued exchange rate. This led to large balance of payments imbalances, a situation which was exacerbated by central banks’ unwillingness to co-operate and follow the ‘rules of the game’.

This is something that Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke commented on in a speech in November 2010. He said: “the United States and France ran large current account surpluses, accompanied by large inflows of gold. However, in defiance of the so-called rules of the game of the international Gold Standard, neither country allowed the higher gold reserves to feed through to their domestic money supplies and price levels, with the result that the real exchange rate in each country remained persistently undervalued. These policies created deflationary pressures in deficit countries that were losing gold, which helped bring on the Great Depression. The Gold Standard was meant to ensure economic and financial stability, but failures of international coordination undermined these very goals.” 5

The huge gold outflows that deficit countries were experiencing, most notably the UK, also undermined confidence in convertibility – an absolute necessity for the Gold Standard to function. This led to a run on sterling, eventually forcing the UK off the Gold Standard in 1931. With the widespread deflation and massive unemployment that came with the Great Depression, other countries, wishing to pursue inflationary policies and devalue their currency in a bid to boost competitiveness, gradually followed.

In the US, one of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first acts on taking power in 1933 was to take the US off the US$20.64 per ounce parity it had held throughout the First World War and the 1920s. The dollar price of gold was gradually raised until it was fixed at the new parity of US$35 per ounce in early 1934. Most other countries, though, remained on floating or managed exchange rates until the outbreak of the Second World War.

1 Rolnick, A. and Weber, W., Money, Inflation and Output under Fiat and Commodity Standards, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review, Vol 22, No 2, Spring 1998; or Bordo, M., Gold as a Commitment Mechanism: Past, Present and Future, World Gold Council Research Study no. 11, December 1995

2Bordo M., The Globalization of International Financial Markets: What Can History Teach Us, (2000), provides a summary and discussion of evidence

3The speech, which advocated a return to bimetallism and famously ended with the words, “you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold” was given at the Democratic Convention. Bryan secured the Democratic nomination for the presidency but lost to William McKinley.

4 Green, T., Central Bank Gold Reserves: An historical perspective since 1845, World Gold Council Research Study no. 23, November 1999, shows that global central bank gold reserves only outstripped monetary gold in private hands from the beginning of the 20th century. The First World War increased the desire of governments to hold gold and central bank reserves rose rapidly in the inter-war period.

5 Bernanke, B., Rebalancing the Global Recovery, Federal Reserve Board, 19th November 2010. Speech available here.

https://www.gold.org/history-and-facts/gold-money

The classical Gold Standard

The Gold Standard was a system under which nearly all countries fixed the value of their currencies in terms of a specified amount of gold, or linked their currency to that of a country which did so. Domestic currencies were freely convertible into gold at the fixed price and there was no restriction on the import or export of gold. Gold coins circulated as domestic currency alongside coins of other metals and notes, with the composition varying by country. As each currency was fixed in terms of gold, exchange rates between participating currencies were also fixed.


Central banks had two overriding monetary policy functions under the classical Gold Standard:
Maintaining convertibility of fiat currency into gold at the fixed price and defending the exchange rate.
Speeding up the adjustment process to a balance of payments imbalance, although this was often violated.


The classical Gold Standard existed from the 1870s to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. In the first part of the 19th century, once the turbulence caused by the Napoleonic Wars had subsided, money consisted of either specie (gold, silver or copper coins) or of specie-backed bank issue notes. However, originally only the UK and some of its colonies were on a Gold Standard, joined by Portugal in 1854. Other countries were usually on a silver or, in some cases, a bimetallic standard.


In 1871, the newly unified Germany, benefiting from reparations paid by France following the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, took steps which essentially put it on a Gold Standard. The impact of Germany’s decision, coupled with the then economic and political dominance of the UK and the attraction of accessing London’s financial markets, was sufficient to encourage other countries to turn to gold. However, this transition to a pure Gold Standard, in some opinions, was more based on changes in the relative supply of silver and gold. Regardless, by 1900 all countries apart from China, and some Central American countries, were on a Gold Standard. This lasted until it was disrupted by the First World War. Periodic attempts to return to a pure classical Gold Standard were made during the inter-war period, but none survived past the 1930s Great Depression.


How the Gold Standard worked


Under the Gold Standard, a country’s money supply was linked to gold. The necessity of being able to convert fiat money into gold on demand strictly limited the amount of fiat money in circulation to a multiple of the central banks’ gold reserves. Most countries had legal minimum ratios of gold to notes/currency issued or other similar limits. International balance of payments differences were settled in gold. Countries with a balance of payments surplus would receive gold inflows, while countries in deficit would experience an outflow of gold.


In theory, international settlement in gold meant that the international monetary system based on the Gold Standard was self-correcting. Namely, a country running a balance of payments deficit would experience an outflow of gold, a reduction in money supply, a decline in the domestic price level, a rise in competitiveness and, therefore, a correction in the balance of payments deficit. The reverse would be true for countries with a balance of payments surplus. This was the so called ‘price-specie flow mechanism’ set out by 18th century philosopher and economist David Hume.


This was the underlying principle of how the Gold Standard operated, although in practice it was more complex. The adjustment process could be accelerated by central bank operations. The main tool was the discount rate (the rate at which the central bank would lend money to commercial banks or financial institutions) which would in turn influence market interest rates. A rise in interest rates would speed up the adjustment process through two channels. First, it would make borrowing more expensive, reducing investment spending and domestic demand, which in turn would put downward pressure on domestic prices, enhancing competitiveness and stimulating exports. Second, higher interest rates would attract money from abroad, improving the capital account of the balance of payments. A fall in interest rates would have the opposite effect. The central bank could also directly affect the amount of money in circulation by buying or selling domestic assets though this required deep financial markets and so was only done to a significant extent in the UK and, latterly, in Germany.


The use of such methods meant that any correction of an economic imbalance would be accelerated and normally it would not be necessary to wait for the point at which substantial quantities of gold needed to be transported from one country to another.


The ‘rules of the game’


The ‘rules of the game’ is a phrase attributed to Keynes (who in fact first used it in the 1920s). While the ‘rules’ were not explicitly set out, governments and central banks were implicitly expected to behave in a certain manner during the period of the classical Gold Standard. In addition to setting and maintaining a fixed gold price, freely exchanging gold with other domestic money and permitting free gold imports and exports, central banks were also expected to take steps to facilitate and accelerate the operation of the standard, as described above. It was accepted that the Gold Standard could be temporarily suspended in times of crisis, such as war, but it also was expected that it would be restored again at the same parity as soon as possible afterwards.


In practice, a number of researchers have subsequently shown1 that central banks did not always follow the ‘rules of the game’ and that gold flows were sometimes ‘sterilised’ by offsetting their impact on domestic money supply by buying or selling domestic assets. Central banks could also affect gold flows by influencing the ‘gold points’. The gold points were the difference between the price at which gold could be purchased from a local mint or central bank and the cost of exporting it. They largely reflected the costs of financing, insuring and transporting the gold overseas. If the cost of exporting gold was lower than the exchange rate (i.e. the price that gold could be sold abroad) then it was profitable to export gold and vice versa.


A central bank could manipulate the gold points, using so-called ‘gold devices’ in order to increase or decrease the profitability of exporting gold and therefore the flow of gold. For example, a bank wishing to slow an outflow of gold could raise the cost of financing for gold exporters, increase the price at which it sold gold, refuse to sell gold completely or change the location where the gold could be picked up in order to increase transportation costs.


Nevertheless, provided such violations of the ‘rules’ were limited, provided deviations from the official parity were minor and, above all, provided any suspension was for a clear purpose and strictly temporary, the credibility of the system was not put in doubt. Bordo2 argues that the Gold Standard was above all a ‘commitment’ system which effectively ensured that policy makers were kept honest and maintained a commitment to price stability.


One further factor which helped the maintenance of the standard was a degree of cooperation between central banks. For example, the Bank of England (during the Barings crisis of 1890 and again in 1906-7), the US Treasury (1893), and the German Reichsbank (1898) all received assistance from other central banks.



1Bloomfield, A., Monetary Policy Under the Gold Standard, 1880 to 1914, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, (1959); Dutton J., The Bank of England and the Rules of the Game under the International Gold Standard: New Evidence, in Bordo M. and Schwartz A., Eds, A Retrospective on the Classical Gold Standard, NBER, (1984)
2Bordo, M., Gold as a Commitment Mechanism: Past. Present and Future, World Gold Council Research Study no. 11, December 1995

企业估值与分析的一般流程

如何相对准确的给企业估值，是成功投资决策做出的前提。当你能够确定一个企业的合理估值时，你就知道什么是价格偏高，什么是价格偏低，也就能够衡量投资的安全边际。 不同企业又有不同的估值方式，故要先给企业分类。可以分成：稳定增长，周期波动，伪稳定增长，小盘成长股，困境反转股。  

稳定增长：代表行业：酒、药等消费类

企业：桂林三金，茅台

估值方法：市盈率

      

这类企业一般符合格雷厄姆选择企业的标准，特点是：规模足够大，行业属于大消费类、周期性不强，有足够长的企业经营史，有稳定的现金流，有持续的分红派息能力，有相对优秀的管理层。这类企业一般是在市场上曾经及至现在都有着优秀业绩与股价表现。这类企业极少，也是老巴所说的皇冠上的明珠。

       

这样的股票，基金会买，机构也会买。因为这是人人皆知的白马股。如果你也显而易见的做这些事，你肯定赚不了大钱。只能在熊市或者遭遇危机的时候，比如上市后连续下跌的三金，08年的伊利，以及今年在塑化剂和三会消费被限的双重打击后的茅台。

     

这类企业在哪个价格下才有安全边际，才值得买入呢？今年茅台下跌的时候我一度还认为它要跌到150再买事实证明是我错失了机会，因为当时还看不透它的价值，只是随着市场的悲观情况一味的再等等，觉得还可以再跌一些，再便宜一些，正如当年20元的贝因美。

      

以行业最低市盈率为例，乳业龙头伊利的股价比较有参考意义，它的最低市盈率在25－20波动区间。那么低于这个标准的股票应该具有安全边际，如果在熊市，应该等低点20倍PE的可能。哪将是最佳的买入时机。

另外，格雷厄姆的成长股公式也有重要的指导意义，做为价值投资的领袖导师，他几十年精心修订书本中提到的公式，当然经过无数次市场的考验。

价值＝当前（普通）收益×（8.5+预期年增长率×2），这个增长数应该是对下一个7至10年的预测。

小小辛巴注：在运用这个公式时预期年增长率应去除百分比，比如说，预期年增长率为10%时，则代入公式的数字应为10，而不是10% 如果用静态市盈率衡量，则桂林三金的价值＝2010年每股收益0.4385元（十股转增三股摊薄）×（8.5+预期年增长率15.02×2）＝16.89979元≈16.90元。

周期波动股：代表行业：煤炭，机械，钢铁，有色，船舶，水泥，建材等

       

企业：中国神化、宝钢、三一重工

估值方法：市净率

这类股票在国外的成熟周期中，市盈率是最不靠谱的一个指标，当它市盈率低的时候，恰恰是连续增长几年的顶峰，如果你在行情很好的时候买入，很快就可以感受到林奇所说的“在市盈率很低的时候买入收益已经增长了好几年的周期性股票，是短期内减少你一半资产的有效办法”，投资这类股票，一旦周期判断错误，踏不准节奏，将会带来无穷无尽的痛苦与折磨。

对于煤炭行业中的翘楚神华来讲，10年煤炭价格如此之高，3年之后的现在却连创出新低，目前PB也只有1.3左右，宝钢的股价早已经跌破净资产很多年了。而今年我买入杭钢的理由居然是投机般的搏重组，看来满口价值的人也是充满投机啊。

企业估值参考行业历史最低PB，还要尽可能分析出行业在一段较长时间内的周期行为，尽量在行业最不景气的时候+熊市的机遇买入。对于行业中的老大，建议以1倍PB为标准，适当买入。

亦可参考辛巴的双重确认法，是股价与业绩都有好转迹象再买入，更为妥帖。

伪稳定增长：代表行业：辅助类小行业

       

企业：伟星股份、瑞贝卡，雪人股份，宁波华翔

       

这个概念前两天才从寒林扎记2011年的总结中看到的，原来也是出自辛巴的定义，很有意思，其实不应该做为一个大类来讲，但是出于它固有的特点，还是列出来。这类企业表面上的稳定增长，实际上周期性很强。如果有市盈率很低的时候买入，结果同样会跟周期股一样的悲惨下场。

       

估值方法，参考周期股

       

小盘成长：代表行业：高科技行业

企业：数字政通、启明星辰

这类企业是林奇的最爱，却不符合老格的投资要求。但是纵观企业发展史，没有小哪来大，没有高速增长，怎么会有后来的稳定增长。所以这种类型可以化到成长股里面，但是因为是盘子小，高速增长，所以要单独列出来讲一下。

      

估值方法：使用老格的成长股公式再好不过了。当然小盘成长的增长率是不可能持续下去的，所以对于已经连续几年高增长的企业要尤其慎重。估值时要考虑其行业属性，周期还是稳增很重要。

      

既然是小盘高速增长，任何小盘股几乎都有几年的高增长，但其真实性却有待考究。所以行业属性跟地位要尤其关注。现金流与负债也是衡量企业是否成长的标准。要恰当把握

       

案例：启明星辰

      

启明星辰近五年主营收入同比增长率为2008年15.95％，2009年11.20％，2010年20.66％，2011年16.21％，2012年70.69％。

       

如果用前四年来平均，是16％，但是，如果加上2012年，就会大幅度跳升，考虑到2012年是收购网御星云并表所带来的增长，实际增速并没有那么大，而且，从过去的增速推断未来，对于发展迅速的行业未必准确。

       

通常来说，网络信息安全的需求滞后于网络的发展。因此，在网络发展越来越成熟之后，信息安全才会迎来快速成长期，目前，我国正处在这个阶段，相关行业预测，接下来几年，整个行业会以18％的速度发展，启明星辰作为该行业的龙头企业，理应取得更快的发展，公司在2012年年报中预计2013年将实现50％以上的增长。

       

综合来看，保守估计，起码能达到20％的年均增速。

       

2013启明星辰价值＝0.37×（8.5＋20×2）＝17.94元。     

安全边际打8.5折＝15.25元。     

安全边际打6折＝10.74元。

       

因此，综合启明星辰相对同行业的最低估值、最优秀基本面，以及市净率及历史价格区间的分析，该股的价值区间大约在15.5元至11元之间。

       

企业在进行高速成长后，通常会进行稳定增长期，之间的过渡会因为市场情绪的变化带来波动，注意把握。

       

困境反转类型：企业：康芝药业、振东制药、好想你

任何行业的企业都有可能遭遇困境，所以不存在行业划分。困境能否反转，也要具体情况具体分析，风险永远与收益并存，这类企业风险最大，同样收益也十分巨大。

       

如何鉴定这样的企业，主线为：PB低，好行业，低负债，以及困境的具体情况。

       

企业的选择上面主要从安全边际上考虑，遭遇困境+熊市的戴维斯双击才能让股价足够的安全，机构的出逃让股价下跌空间减小，负债低可以让企业走出困境，行业好才不会被整体淘汰。

       

这类企业最好基于辛巴的双重确认买入，

1.股价的确便宜，低于净资产时买入。

2.企业出现业绩好转迹象，股价仍然便宜再买入。

       

后记：

       

写在最后只是强调安全边际，企业估值即使再合理，在市场因素中同样也会有不断的波动。乐观的时候不可思议的放大，悲观的时候无法揣测的恐惧。利用好市场的波动会带来更加超额的收益，利用不好市场会带来持股的不断煎熬，“守股如守寡”正是这类人的真实写照。

       

不同类型企业一般持有原则为：稳定增长股适合于集中，周期波动股适当集中，小盘成长股应适度分散。仓位控制上面多做安排，可以防范个股风险带来的严重损失。

       

如何化解市场波动带来的煎熬，辛巴的五档买入提供给一个比较切实可行的操作方法。企业在具有安全边际的合理价格时，使用这种方法买入，一是可以捕获底部，也避免心态搞坏。防止出现整体特殊悲观市场时的价格严重偏离价值。是居家旅行，杀人越货的必备技巧。

理解现金流折现，估值并不难

 股神巴菲特年复一年的告诉全世界投资者：「投资没那么复杂。你只需要学习两门课程就可以了，一门是如何评估企业价值，一门是如何看待股市波动」。著名价值投资人赛思.卡拉曼在其经典著作《安全边际》当中也谈到：「投资没有什么神秘的。简而言之就是先确定某个证券的内在价值，然后以这个价值的适当折扣买进。事情就是那么简单。」

如何才能知道一家企业的价值呢？塞斯.卡拉曼说：「虽然存在许多用于企业价值评估的方法，但我发现只有三种方法是有用的。一是对连续经营价值的分析，也就是现金流折现法。通过计算一家企业未来可能产生的全部现金流折现值来计算企业价值。第二种是分析一家企业的清算价值。第三种是股市价值法，通过预测一家企业或其子公司分拆后，会在股市上以怎样的价格进行交易，来评估企业价值。这种方法的可靠性不及前两种方法，它只会偶尔成为有用的价值准绳。」

抛开赛思.卡拉曼认为不太可靠的第三种方法，剩余的两种企业价值评估方法，分化出了价值投资的两大流派：一种更传统，更注重企业清算价值。他们寻找那些售价在重置成本以下的机会；另一种更注重现金流，他们寻找售价低于企业未来现金流折现值的机会。

早期的巴菲特，是格雷厄姆的信徒，更偏重于企业的清算价值。后期的巴菲特，受菲利普.费雪(代表作《怎样选择成长股》）和查理.芒格的影响，逐渐转向了现金流折现法，完成了他自己所称的从猿到人的进化。

运用现金流折现法，首先要了解两个概念：自由现金流、折现。

自由现金流，是从企业通过经营活动获取的现金里，减去为了维持生意运转必须进行的资本投入，余下的那部分现金。

折现的概念不难。如果确认年收益10%，那么一年后的110万和今天的100万等价。换句话说，一年后的110万，按照10%的折现率折算，其现值为100万。理论上，可以将企业未来每年的自由现金流，按照某折现率（无风险收益率+风险补偿）逐笔折现。所有年份现金流的折现值加总，便是该企业的价值。

实际运用中，通常会逐笔计算出一段时间的自由现金流，然后对其后的部分，估算一个永续价值。将这段时间的现金流和其后的永续价值，逐笔折现、加总，得出企业的价值。例如，某企业今年底可产生自由现金流10亿，预计五年内自由现金流的年增长15%。五年后，自由现金流能保持3%的年增长。若按照10%的折现值估算，企业前五年现金流折现值加总，等于49.8亿（9.1+9.5+9.9+10.4+10.9）。第6年，自由现金流18.36亿，其永续价值为262.3亿（18.36/（10%-3%））。将262.3亿折现，现值约为148亿。由此，测算的企业内在价值约为198亿。知道了价值，投资者才能决定如何出价。

敲敲计算器，便知道企业价值，而后依此投资获利，有这么简单吗？当然没有。首先，预测未来无限期的自由现金流，是不可能完成的任务。其次，折现率的微小变动，会使结果呈现巨大差异。尝试将本例的折现率，小幅调整至8%或12%，或将永续增长率3%调整为0%或5%，会看到计算结果发生了多么令人惊讶的变化。

既然不能依赖其对企业价值进行计算，这套方法还有什么用呢？有用，非常有用。甚至毫不夸张地说，现金流折现法就是「股神秘笈」。它是一套完整的投资体系。它告诉我们应该选择什么样的股票，应该规避什么样的股票，在什么区间进行买入，在什么区间进行卖出。

首先，它叫做永续现金流折现。因此，目标企业必须是可能永远存在的，至少在你的人生跨度内，它可能是始终存在的，没有被竞争对手或新科技所取代或毁灭。否则，依据现金流折现公式看，永续价值将非常低。除非其市值低于破产清算值，否则，它不是现金流折现法的能力范围。从这个角度，便很容易理解，为何许多成功投资人都会规避初创企业和高科技企业（这些企业适用概率估值法、相对估值法或股市价值法），甚至有人宣称「只投资和嘴有关的企业」。

其次，目标企业必须能通过出售商品或服务，年复一年的获取大量现金。这些现金的大部或全部，可以分给股东或进行有利可图的新投资，无需用以维持现有生意的运转。在现金流折现法里，只有持续产生自由现金流的企业，折现值才为正数，其价值才能进行评估，投资回报才无需依赖下一个出高价傻蛋的出现。

再次，企业是否具备永续增长的可能，对估值的影响很大。企业是否可以通过提升毛利率或增加销售量，使自由现金流保持增长态势，将大幅影响企业价值。回到前面的例子，其他条件不变，如果自由现金流的永续增长从3%变为0%，计算结果将缩水约1/4。

接着，现金流折现法，提示了买入区间。同样用前面的例子，意图获得10%的收益，投资者可以在市场报价低于198亿时考虑买入。若意图获得30%收益，企业价值将低于45亿，投资者就必须等到市场报价低于45亿时，才能考虑买入。显然，既定买价越低，错过机会的概率也就越大。

然后，一家可能永续存在，每年产生可观的自由现金流，且能保持增长的企业，是否就可以根据其现金流折现值，进行投入呢？答案仍然是no。如果企业价值1000万，出价1000万买下，意味着用1元买1元，毫无意义。回看《安全边际》导言中所说的：「价值投资没有什么神秘的。简而言之就是先确定某个证券内在价值，然后以这个价值的适当折扣买进。事情就是那么简单。」适当折扣，就是安全边际思想。无论对企业做多么详细的了解，无论估值多么保守，投资者仍然可能犯错。此时，预留的安全边际，就可以使投资者在预计正确时获取暴利，在预计错误时损失不大。

最后，如果市场对投资者手持股权的出价，高到将其变现后存入银行的利息（存款的自由现金流）折现值，已经高于最乐观估算的该企业自由现金流折现值，这便是考虑卖出的时机了。《安全边际》说：「只有当价格变得有吸引力时才买进，而情况相反时就卖出」。

老窖是活生生的案例

此处以泸州老窖这只当前市场弃儿为例，轮廓性演示一下现金流折现法的运用。首先，泸州老窖从大明万历皇帝登基的1573年开始酿造。四百多年，无论繁荣还是萧条，战争还是和平，盛世或是乱世，都没有妨碍老窖的悠悠酒香，由此，可以大概率的认定，泸州老窖未来依然会存在。

其次，泸州老窖每年都可以通过出售商品，获取大量现金。且，其生产设备（酒窖）无需投入大量现金维护。数据显示，过去十年，泸州老窖累计经营现金流，大于累计净利润。而累计资本投入额占净利润总额不足13%，占销售收入总额不足5%。截止目前，尚未发现出售商品获取现金的能力，及低资本投入的特点，有任何改变的迹象。

再次，公司预计2013年净利润34.4亿，同比下降21.55%。如果以此为基础，毛估估未来两年净利润继续同比下降20%，其后触底保持5%的永续增长。即2014年净利润27.5亿，2015年净利润22亿，其后年利润增幅为5%。对于泸州老窖，可以粗略的将净利润等同于经营现金流，将资本支出估算为净利润的15%。那么，我们将得到2013~2016年的自由现金流约为29.2亿，23.4亿，18.7亿,19.6亿。

最后，假设采用10%的折现率，2013~2015年的自由现金流折现值总和为66亿（29.2+21.3+15.4）。其永续价值为392亿（19.6/（10%-5%））。2016年的392亿折现值为295亿。因此，在上述假设条件下，其内在价值约为365亿（295+66）。

以上计算，仅仅用于演示现金流折现法的运用，非投资建议。

估值追求的是大概的对。巴菲特叫它作「模糊的正确胜过精确的错误」，精彩。可惜常被一些投资者，用于掩盖对企业基本面研究的懒惰。既然是大概的对，其数值究竟有多么接近正确答案，取决于投资者对企业生意模式的认识度，取决于各项假设是否符合实际。当投资者通过大量研究，确信假设不算过分乐观时，市场在365亿基础上给予的折扣，便是送给投资者的财富。

这就是现金流折现法的投资体系，这就是足本的股神秘笈。

投资，知易行难或知难行更难。这里聚集着全世界最聪明的人群，都想在最短时间内，用最少的金钱获取最大的利润。竞争当然残酷，甚至残酷过世上绝大多数生意。真的明白一家企业的现金流折现值，已属不易，更难的是如何保持耐心和纪律。让我们再次回味塞斯.卡拉曼在书中所说「最大的挑战来自于始终保持不可缺少的耐心和纪律，只有当价格变得有吸引力时才买进，而情况相反时就卖出，坚决避免卷入那种吞噬市场人士的追逐短期业绩的狂热之中。」

坚守现金流折现的理念，仅仅投资你能估算的企业，忘掉依赖未来价格的变动的投机游戏，无疑会使我们错过无数鸡犬升天的牛股，却也能使自己免于成为最后一个出高价的傻蛋。巴菲特在最新的致股东信中这样告诫我们说：「聚焦于拟投资资产的未来生产力。没有必要成为全能者，理解自己的所作所为就可以了」。


作者: 证券市场周刊  发布时间: 2014-03-13 14:32:05

股市与经济时有背离

巴菲特论市：股市与经济时有背离

 证券新闻第一财经日报[微博] 冯郁青 张安哲2014-08-21 07:27 

5年多前,道琼斯工业指数在6000多点。6年前,上证指数也在6000多点。现在道指已经突破17000点，而沪指却回到了2000多点,两者差距悬殊。但实际上在过去的5年中，美国经济并没有像股市表现得那样出色，GDP增长仅在2%左右；中国经济在这一段时期保持着8%左右的快速增长，而股市却一直低迷。


那么股市和宏观经济并无必然联系？巴菲特在1999年《财富》杂志的一篇文章中指出，从1964年到1981年的17年间，美国GDP增长了373%；而道指在1964年12月31日是874.12点，17年后的同一天是875点，几乎持平。虽然时间久远，但这篇文章仍然充满了投资的智慧，一点也不过时。现在，让我们来看看巴菲特的解释。


这篇文章与美国投资者的长期收益相关。巴菲特一向坚持长期投资策略，但即便是以耐心著称的他也不觉得市场向前迈了一步。巴菲特认为，股票投资者都对股市抱有太高的期望。要想解释其中的原因，必须从股市整体出发。他明确表示，虽然会涉及到股市的整体水平，但不会预测大盘走势。对市场进行评估和预测市场发展之间没有一丁点联系。实际上很多时候市场会偏离价值，不过早晚也会向价值靠拢。


在之前的34年，我们看到了熊市和牛市惊人的对称，在1964到1981年第一个17年间道琼斯工业指数：1964年12月21日874.12点、1981年12月31日875.00点。一个非常矛盾的事实：在同样的17年间，美国国民生产总值（即美国国内所有交易的总和）几乎变成了原来的五倍，上升了约370%。在另一种衡量标准下，《财富》五百强公司（当然，公司组成不断变化）的销售总额变成了原先的六倍多。但是道琼斯工业指数几乎没动。





“投资”的定义很简单却常常被人忽略：投资就是现在投入本金以便将来拿回更多的钱（当然是刨去通货膨胀之后的“更多”）。要想理解上述原因，可着眼于影响投资价值变化的两个因素之一：利率。利率就像万有引力影响着物理世界一样操控着金融市场 。利率越高，向下的作用力越大。这是因为投资者要求的收益率直接与投资政府债券可以得到的无风险利率息息相关。所以，如果政府债券收益率上升，其他的投资产品的价值就会下降。反之，利率下降，其他投资的价格上升。其中的道理十分简单：今天投资者应该为明天得到的一块钱付多少钱，只能先参考无风险利率。


每当无风险利率变动一个基点，即0.01%，所有投资的现有价值都会变化。这种关系在债券市场表现得尤其明显，债券的价格几乎只与无风险利率有关。股票、房地产、农产品等资产的价格与其他一些重要因素有关，因而利率的作用没有那么明显，但是它仍像万有引力一样影响着资产价格。在1964到1981年间，政府债券利率大幅上涨，从1964年底的4%上升到1981年末的15%。利率的上升压制了资产价格，也就解释了经济增长而股票市场停滞的现象。


然而在20世纪80年代初，情况发生了转变。你可能还记得保罗·沃尔克刚当上美联储主席时是多么不受欢迎。但是他的英雄事迹在于大幅度削减通货膨胀率，引起利率水平大幅下降。假设你买了100万美元1981年11月16日发行的收益率14%的30年期美国国债并用每年的利息购入同样的债券，到1998年底，长期政府债券利率为5%，这时候你的回报是8181219美元，年化收益率13%还多。这可比历史上大多数17年股票带来的收益率都高，对于国债这样传统的证券来说，可谓一个巨大的成功。利率的下降将股市推高，你如果在1981年11月16日投入100万美元到道琼斯股指并且将股利全部再投资的话，到1998年12月31日，你将拥有19720112美元，年化收益率19%。这比历史上任何一段17年时期的收益率都要高。


影响投资价值变化的第二个原因是公司的税后利润。公司利润占国民生产总值的百分比在1929年达到顶峰，此后逐渐下降，在1982年触底，只有3.5%。当时的投资者们面临着两个坏消息：公司利润不景气与超高的利率。此时，投资者们又一次展现出了他们根深蒂固的恶习：以当前的情况预测今后的市场。就像行车时只看后视镜不看前方一样。他们对未来失去信心，觉得利率会保持在高位而公司利润也会停滞不前。即使国民生产总值接近原来的五倍，他们仍然将市场定位在17年前的水平。在1982年后的17年间，经济虽然没有像原先一样迅猛增长，国民生产总值变为了不到原先的三倍。但是利率开始下降，随着沃尔克政策的影响逐渐消退，公司利润也开始增长。


以上两个基本面因素的变化导致道琼斯工业指数在1981年起的17年间上涨了几乎十倍，从875点到9181点。此间，市场心理也在悄悄起着作用。当牛市来临，并且发展到不管采取什么样投资策略都赚钱时，更多的人便会涌向股市。这时候利率和公司收益便不再起作用，而是投资者不甘落后的心理在主导市场。


有了过去这17年的经验，很多投资者都对未来抱有美好的愿景。潘恩·韦伯公司和盖洛普公司的联合调查显示，拥有五年以下经验的投资新手预期未来十年的投资收益率达22.6%，而拥有20年以上经验的投资者则预期12.9%。巴菲特认为，从价值决定性因素来看，12.9%仍然是个太高的目标。如果投资者想要在未来17到20年间从市场上获取可观的回报，以下三点至少出现一个。


第一，利率必须达到更低的水平。如果政府债券利率从现在的6%下降到3%，仅凭利率的作用就能使投资价值翻番。如果你觉得利率水平会像日本之前那样跌到1%，那你就应该采取杠杆操作：投资股票期权。


第二，公司利润占国民生产总值百分比必须上升。有人曾经说纽约的律师比人口还多，可能也是这些人相信公司利润会比国民生产总值还大。公司利润增长速度不可能永远比GDP增长得快，这在数学上是讲不通的。在巴菲特看来，如果你觉得公司利润占GDP水平能维持在6%，就是非常乐观了。其中一个原因是竞争。另外一个是公共政策：如果公司投资者想分享越来越大的一块经济的蛋糕，其他群体吃到的就越来越少。这势必会引起政策上的问题，蛋糕的重新分配是不太可能发生的。在合理的假设下，GDP每年以5%速度增长，3%的实际增长速度加上2%的通货膨胀。这将是投资回报的一个限制因素——远远小于12%。如果投资回报维持在5%以下，那么资产价格在长期也不可能以高于5%的速度增长。


第三，你是一个乐观主义者，即使在其他投资者举步维艰的时期都相信自己是一个赢家。这个想法在信息革命之初极具诱惑力，你的经纪人会告诉你，只要买蓝筹股然后坐享其成就好了。巴菲特觉得有必要回顾一下历史，着眼于本世纪初两个改变世界的行业：汽车和航天业。首先是汽车行业：历史上曾经有过2000多家汽车制造商，你可能会说：“如果当时预见到汽车行业带来如此大的社会变革，就赚大发了！”那么20世纪90年代的行业格局究竟怎样呢？除了卡耐基公司还在坚持之外，美国的汽车制造商只剩下三家。没错，汽车行业是造成了巨大的商业变革，但却没有像投资者预期的那样带来巨大的收益，反而是亏损。其实有时候挑选行业的失败者比较容易，当汽车行业开始兴起，你仍然发现挑选出今后能够盈利的企业非常困难。但当时有个非常明显的选择：做空马匹。1900年美国有2100万匹马，然而到1998年就只有500万匹了。


另外一个带来社会变革的行业就是航空业，前景如此光明让投资者垂涎。巴菲特查到了1991年到1993年间约200家的飞机制造商，只有几家现如今还在营业。在过去20年间宣告破产的129家飞机制造商名单中，大陆航空荣登榜单两次。实际上，1992年的时候，美国的航空公司成立以来的利润为零。早知如此在1903年莱特兄弟试飞第一架飞机的时候就应该把它打下来，省得投资者以后亏钱。


还有其他一些很辉煌但没有给投资者带来盈利的行业，如电视、收音机制造业，这里就不一一举例了。我们能从中学到的教训是：投资的精髓不在于某个行业会给社会带来多大的变革，或是有多大的发展潜力，而在于单个公司是否能保持竞争优势。那些准入壁垒高的行业或者公司，才能在长期给投资者带来收益。


(第一财经（微博)日报)

Money as Debt 3