A Unique Behind-The-Scenes Look Into Warren Buffett’s Investment Process

by Vintage Value Investing

In 2009, the U.S. government established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, a ten-member commission that was assigned the task of investigating the causes of the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The Commission had the power to subpoena documents and witnesses (businessmen and women, academicians, government officials, etc.) for testimony.

One person the Commission questioned was Warren Buffett.

The interview covered Warren Buffett’s investment in Moody’s, his thoughts on the causes of the financial crisis, his views on financial policies and regulations, and a whole host of other topics. Although the interview took place in 2010 and the Commission reported its findings in 2011, the transcript was not released until last week.

You can read all 103 pages of the interview right here (it’s really fascinating).

But in just the first few pages of the transcript, Warren Buffett gives a unique behind-the-scenes look into his investment process.

Here’s a little background to set up this situation:

Buffett invested in Dun & Bradstreet in 1999 and 2000. Founded in 1841, Dun & Bradstreet provides commercial data (e.g. business credit reports, sales & marketing lists, business research reports through its Hoover’s subsidiary) and was one of the first companies to be publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. In 2000, Dun & Bradstreet spun off Moody’s (one of the major credit rating agencies, which D&B bought in 1962) as a separately traded public company – which gave Buffett shares in both Dun & Bradstreet and Moody’s.

The major credit rating agencies (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) were very heavily criticized during the 2007-2008 financial crisis for giving perfect credit ratings (e.g. AAA) to bad subprime mortgage-backed CDOs – which ended up being a big contributing factor to the financial crisis.

So, the interviewer from the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission begins his interview with Buffett by asking how he decided to invest in Moody’s and what his involvement with the company has been. I’ve lightly edited the transcript below to make it more readable. Enjoy!

Warren Buffett and How He Decided to Invest in Moody’s

BONDI: I understand, sir, that in 1999 and in February 2000, you invested in Dun and Bradstreet.

BUFFETT: That’s correct. I don’t have the dates, but that sounds right. Yes, sir.

BONDI: And am I correct, sir, in saying you made no purchases after Moody’s spun off from Dun and Bradstreet?

BUFFETT: I believe that’s correct.

BONDI: Okay. What kind of due diligence did you and your staff do when you first purchased Dun and Bradstreet in 1999 and then again in 2000?

BUFFETT: Yes. There is no staff. I make all the investment decisions, and I do all my own analysis. And basically it was an evaluation of both Dun and Bradstreet and Moody’s, but of the economics of their business. And I never met with anybody.

Dun and Bradstreet had a very good business, and Moody’s had an even better business. And basically, the single-most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. If you’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business. And if you have to have a prayer session before raising the price by a tenth of a cent, then you’ve got a terrible business. I’ve been in both, and I know the difference.

BONDI: Now, you’ve described the importance of quality management in your investing decisions and I know your mentor, Benjamin Graham – I happen to have read his book as well – has described the importance of management.

What attracted you to the management of Moody’s when you made your initial investments?

BUFFETT: I knew nothing about the management of Moody’s. I’ve also said many times in reports and elsewhere that when a management with reputation for brilliance gets hooked up with a business with a reputation for bad economics, it’s the reputation of the business that remains intact. If you’ve got a good enough business, if you have a monopoly newspaper, if you have a network television station (I’m talking of the past) you know, your idiot nephew could run it. And if you’ve got a really good business, it doesn’t make any difference.

I mean, it makes some difference maybe in capital allocation or something of the sort, but the extraordinary business does not require good management.

I’m not making any reference to Moody’s management, I don’t really know them. But if you own the only newspaper in town, up until the last five years or so, you have pricing power and you didn’t have to go to the office.

BONDI: And I’ve seen in many places where you’ve been referred to as a passive investor in Moody’s. Is that a fair characterization, and what sort of interactions and communications have you had with the board and with management at Moody’s?

BUFFETT: At the very start, there was a fellow named Cliff Alexander who was the chairman of Dun and Bradstreet while they were breaking it up.

I met him in connection with something else, years earlier; and so we had a lunch at one time. But he wasn’t really an operating manager. He was there sort of to oversee the breakup of the situation.

Since we really own stock in both Dun and Bradstreet and Moody’s when they got split up, I’ve never been in Moody’s office, I don’t think I’ve ever initiated a call to them. I would say that three or four times as part of a general road show, their CEO and the investor relations person would stop by and – and they think they have to do that. I have no interest in it basically, and I never requested a meeting. It just – it was part of what they thought investor relations were all about. And we don’t believe much in that.

BONDI: What about any board members? Have you pressed for the election of any board member to Moody’s –

BUFFETT: No, no –

BONDI: – board?

BUFFETT: – I have no interest in it.

BONDI: And we’ve talked about just verbal communications. Have you sent any letters or submitted any memos or ideas for strategy decisions at Moody’s?

BUFFETT: No.

BONDI: In –

BUFFETT: If I thought they needed me, I wouldn’t have bought the stock.

BONDI: In 2006, Moody’s began to repurchase its shares, buying back its shares that were outstanding, and they did so from 2006 to 2008, according to our records.

Why didn’t you sell back your shares to Moody’s at that time? I know subsequent in 2009 you sold some shares, but from ‘06 to ‘09, during the buyback, did you consider selling your shares back, and if so, why didn’t you?

BUFFETT: No, I thought they had an extraordinary business, and – you know, they still have an extraordinary business. It’s now subject to a different threat, which we’ll get into later, I’m sure.

But I made a mistake in that it got to very lofty heights and we didn’t sell – it didn’t make any difference if we were selling to them or selling in the market. But there are very few businesses that had the competitive position that Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s had. They both have the same position, essentially. There are very few businesses like that in the world. It’s a natural duopoly to some extent. Now, that may get changed, but it has historically been a natural duopoly, where anybody coming in and offering to cut their price in half had no chance of success. And there’s not many businesses where someone can come in and offer to cut the price in half and somebody doesn’t think about shifting. But that’s the nature of the ratings business. And it’s a naturally obtained one.

It’s assisted by the fact that the two of them became a standard for regulators and all of that, so it’s been assisted by the governmental actions over time. But it’s a natural duopoly.

Warren Buffett and Investment Models

BUFFETT: The rating agencies, they have models, and we all have models in our mind, you know, when we’re investing. But they’ve got them all worked out, with a lot of checklists and all of that sort of thing.

I don’t believe in those, myself.

All I can say is, I’ve got a model in my mind. Everybody has a model in their mind when they’re making investments.  But reliance on models, you know, work 98 percent of the time, but they never work 100 percent of the time. And everybody ought to realize that, that’s using them.

Summary

So what conclusions can we draw from this behind-the-scenes look?

Well, first I still think Buffett’s investment process is incredible. Every other investment firm in the world has research analysts, market strategists, complex financial models, fully staffed deal teams, and intense investment committees. Warren Buffett, on the other hand, does all of his own analysis and uses the model in his own head. Just amazing.

Second, Warren Buffett tells us that “the single-most important decision in evaluating a business is pricing power. If you’ve got the power to raise prices without losing business to a competitor, you’ve got a very good business.” Moody’s has pricing power because it has a duopoly of the credit ratings market with Standard & Poor’s (and to a lesser extent Fitch). If you want a credit rating, you basically have to go to Moody’s or S&P, because they are the industry standard and often are the only credit ratings that are accepted by investors and others. In fact, Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch are the only nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSRO) designated by the SEC. So someone new could come in and set up a ratings agency and charge 50% what Moody’s and S&P charge, but they just wouldn’t get any business.

As a kid, Buffett used to sit on the porch of his friend’s house and watch the cars and the street trolley pass on the street in front of the house during rush hour. One day he said to his friend’s mom, “All that traffic. What a shame you aren’t making money from the people going by. What a shame, Mrs. Russell.” Even little 9 year old Warren was thinking about businesses, and he wanted his friend’s mom to set up a toll booth. And that’s how he’s always thought about businesses and investing. Warren Buffett’s always sought out businesses with large economic moats – businesses that have a large, unique, and sustainable competitive advantage that ultimate results in pricing power and high returns on invested capital.

Jackpot股的誘惑 - 買股票如買彩票

毕老林 2014年4月16日


4月15日，周二。南非「股王」Naspers掌舵人科斯貝克獨具慧眼，2001年斥資3200萬美元買入接近半家騰訊（700），十三年來一股未賣，當年的3200萬，今天已變成600億。許多人發夢都想成為第二個科斯貝克，於草創時期押注「一窮二白」的企業，若干年後迎來百倍千倍回報。


在芸芸蚊型公司中發掘下一家騰訊，固然有若大海撈針，但事實告訴大家，散戶渴望一朝發達，莫說十三年，一兩年恐怕也嫌長。此所以，生物科技股中十隻未必有一隻賺錢，投資者對這個板塊也顯得忽冷忽熱，惟生科股相對大市永遠「貴」得離譜。道理很簡單，買入IBM以至今天的騰訊，一年漲10倍近乎不可能。然而，押注一隻可能成功研發「癌症剋星」的小型生科股，莫說一年，一天漲10倍亦非全無機會。生科板塊難炒眾所周知，但願意為可望而不可即的夢想pay up者，任何時候皆大不乏人。對這類投資者而言，買股票跟買彩票實無兩樣。


買股票如買彩票


有投資網站做過研究，以市盈率、股價對銷售比率等指標衡量，美股中估值最昂貴的10％股票，多達四成來自3個產業，分別為藥物及生物科技、電腦硬件及器材，以及電腦軟件及服務。美國上市公司覆蓋多達24個主要行業，「超貴」股票卻分布於上述三個產業，足證此類「彩票股」於板塊上何等集中。科網和生科股近日跌個四腳朝天，現在正是探討「彩票股」的適當時候。


市民投注六合彩，無非憧憬一朝發達，買的是一個極之渺茫的可能性（possibility）。即使最不切實際的人，相信亦不可能天真到以為花上十元八塊，便能換來一個發生概率高的機會（a high probability of happening）。

慎防成手「蟹貨」

正如六合彩投注人深知中獎機會微乎其微一樣，買入「超貴」且集中於兩三個板塊股票的投資者，心裏想必十分清楚，這些公司只有極少數能成為下一隻騰訊、蘋果或Google。然而，他們隨即想到，騰訊、Google不也有過寂寂無聞，就如今天市場上那些「彩票股」的日子嗎？唔賭唔知時運高，who knows？

許多讀者相信都有像老畢那樣的經驗，每天收到自稱投資顧問的電郵推介，焦點雖不一而足，但皆對準三數概念，比如物聯網、頁岩革命、新能源，以至無人駕駛飛機，把這些廣為人知的發展包裝成冰山一角，着力促銷The Next Big Thing。說穿了，此等「專家」殊無新意，所謂The Next Big Thing，不過聲稱「發現」較Bakken和Eagle Ford加起來還要大的頁岩能源產區，又或無人駕駛飛機如何深入國民生活的每個層面，諸如此類。

長篇大論並不足夠，要說服看官大解慳囊，「專家」下一步是舉出若干實例，再登幾段真假難辨的「用戶謝辭」，力求傳達「唔訂走寶」的訊息。卻其實，要在市場上找幾隻現成的「Jackpot股」，何難之有？從【附表】可見，2008至2013年，四隻沒有盈利、股價對銷售比率極高的生科和新能源股，俱有過一年狂升5倍至15倍的紀錄。「專家」拿這些已「派彩」的「彩票股」誘使投資者訂閱其服務，白付訂費事小，在最不適當的時候買入成手「蟹貨」事大。

換個形式接火棒

數據顯示，若把估值最昂貴（相對盈利／銷售，市場期望最高）的10％股票視作「彩票股」，以美國上市公司為準，自1963年以來年均跑輸標普500指數8.5個百分點。與上述四個「Jackpot股」例子相反，假設閣下自1963年以來每年買入一籃子「彩票股」，隨後一年多達六成股份變「蟹貨」；餘下四成雖錄得升幅，惟1963年至今投資組合整體年均回報僅1.5％，遠遜標普500指數同期每年約10％的升幅。

理性投資者對估值瘋狂的板塊自然敬而遠之，但人在江湖身不由己，即使閣下聽從畢非德忠告，被動地買入標普500指數基金，亦難保不跟隨心存僥幸者一起「追夢」，理由是標普500按市值定權重，動力十足的強勢股佔比自動上調，個市癲起上來，閣下換個形式接了火棒，可能也懵然不知。


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跟超富揀股有「數」?

2014年8月9日

畢老林 投資者日記

8月8日，周五。許多投資者發夢也想着享有畢非德、索羅斯、David Einhorn一樣的投資回報。自認揀股一絕的股民，索性封自己為港版股神、炒聖。

索羅斯、畢非德既為投資世界「萬人迷」，戰績輝煌不言而喻。然而，那是根據數十年回報得出的結論。不管怎麼「神」，在挫折面前無人能免疫，一兩年甚至三四年跑輸大市，沒什麼值得大驚小怪。

研究機構Bespoke跟畢非德「算過賬」，發現巴郡15大持股連同美銀認股證，今年表現明顯遜於標普500指數。早在4月，Bespoke已做過相同調查，於巴郡持股與標普500之間作出對比，發現首四個月巴郡輕微落後0.8個百分點。

本月再作檢討，發現畢非德愛股不僅未能追回失地，距離且進一步擴大，2014年迄今跑輸2.85個百分點，連股息總回報則落後2.86個百分點。以過去12個月為準，巴郡15大持股輸得更遠，不計股息落後6.27個百分點，連股息總回報輸6.39個百分點【表】。

專攻富豪愛股

仔細點看，畢非德愛股表現榮辱互見，比重最高的富國銀行（Wells Fargo）、DirecTV、穆迪、DaVita HealthCare、ConocoPhillips和紐約梅倫銀行，年初以來皆錄得雙位數升幅。然而，通用汽車、可口可樂、沃爾瑪、美國運通、寶潔以至埃克森等大藍籌，表現卻令人失望；升跌相抵，巴郡15大持股明顯跑輸標指。

老畢引述「股神」愛股表現，非為比而比。正如前述，任何投資者皆不可能年年贏季季勝。摘錄Bespoke的統計，只因美國資產管理公司Direxion 8月1日推出一隻名為iBillionaire Index ETF的交易所買賣基金（上市代號IBLN）。顧名思義，這隻基金的賣點是仿效超富投資者選股，以30隻為限，組成一個指數，ETF組合正是立足於此。

投資意念泉源

按照Direxion的介紹，iBillionaire指數僅包括標普500成分股，根據投資富豪向美國證監提呈的13F最新紀錄「擇優而買」。

靠投資揚名的超級富豪屈指可數，iBillionaire的仿效對象，離不開畢非德、索羅斯、David Einhorn以至Bill Ackman等舉世知名的基金經理。Direxion如何在他們之中權衡輕重、於投資風格上有沒有特別偏好，老畢無法肯定。然而，Direxion聲稱，自去年10月面世以來，iBillionaire上升16％，勝於標普500同期11.8％的回報。

按照第三方進行的回溯測試，iBillionaire過去八年回報約雙倍於標普500。

基金公司推介新產品，自然賣花讚花香，以今天ETF之五花八門，賣點跟噱頭足以畫上等號。

可是，老畢對仿效知名投資者持股的「策略」抱開放態度，非因盲目相信「大師」，而是他們的愛股不難成為個人買賣的靈感來源。你不一定要購入相關ETF，但不妨從基金追蹤的股票發掘投資意念。

老畢經常懷疑，基金經理動輒跑輸大市，到底是他們真的那麼不濟，還是過度分散弄巧成拙。

換句話說，出色的揀股人不一定是稱職的資產管理者。研究發現，持有20隻股票足以享受91％來自分散投資的好處；持股多於20隻，為組合帶來的額外效益微乎其微。基金大都迷信分散投資，持股100隻以上者比比皆是，對回報有害無益。

切勿走火入魔

不過，找靈感歸找靈感，千萬別走火入魔，像Bill Ackman死咬康寶萊（Herbalife）那樣，迫人唔死反把自己推向牆角，到頭來全無退路。投資不過求財，一旦牽涉個人榮辱為啖氣，那便誰都幫你唔到了。

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The Wisdom of Peter Lynch

• Although it's easy to forget sometimes, a share is not a lottery ticket... it's part-ownership of a business.

• Don't bottom fish.

•  Everyone has the brainpower to follow the stock market. If you made it through fifth-grade math, you can do it.

• Go for a business that any idiot can run - because sooner or later, any idiot probably is going to run it.

• I don't go near the money and the money doesn't go near me.

• I think you have to learn that there's a company behind every stock, and that there's only one real reason why stocks go up. Companies go from doing poorly to doing well or small companies grow to large companies.

• I've found that when the market's going down and you buy funds wisely, at some point in the future you will be happy. You won't get there by reading 'Now is the time to buy.'

• If all the economists in the world were laid end to end, it wouldn't be a bad thing.

• Improved turnout will give parliament and government the appearance of being more legitimate.

• It's human nature to keep doing something as long as it's pleasurable and you can succeed at it - which is why the world population continues to double every 40 years.

• Suicide is a permanent solution to a temporary problem. Suicide is a choice and I think if we work with that with kids, we'll get somewhere.

• The person that turns over the most rocks wins the game. And that's always been my philosophy.

• When stocks are attractive, you buy them. Sure, they can go lower. I've bought stocks at $12 that went to $2, but then they later went to $30. You just don't know when you can find the bottom.

• You get recessions, you have stock market declines. If you don't understand that's going to happen, then you're not ready, you won't do well in the markets.

• There's no shame in losing money on a stock. Everybody does it. What is shameful is to hold on to a stock, or, worse, to buy more of it, when the fundamentals are deteriorating.

• A person infatuated with measurement, who has his head stuck in the sand of the balance sheets, is not likely to succeed.

• In business, competition is never as healthy as total domination.

• Your investor's edge is not something you get from Wall Street experts. It's something you already have. You can outperform the experts if you use your edge by investing in companies or industries you already understand.

• Owning stocks is like having children - don't get involved with more than you can handle.

• If you can't find any companies that you think are attractive, put your money in the bank until you discover some.

• A stock market decline is as routine as a January blizzard in Colorado. If you're prepared, it can't hurt you. A decline is a great opportunity to pick up the bargains left behind by investors who are fleeing the storm in panic.

• There is always something to worry about. Avoid weekend thinking and ignore the latest dire predictions of the newscasters. Sell a stock because the company's fundamentals deteriorate, not because the sky is falling.

    

Peter Lynch Stock Selection Criteria

By Maria Crawford Scott

No modern-day investment "sage" is better known than Peter Lynch. Not only has his investment approach successfully passed the real-world performance test, but he strongly believes that individual investors have a distinct advantage over Wall Street and large money managers when using his approach. Individual investors, he feels, have more flexibility in following this basic approach because they are unencumbered by bureaucratic rules and short-term performance concerns.

Mr. Lynch developed his investment philosophy at Fidelity Management and Research, and gained his considerable fame managing Fidelity’s Magellan Fund. The fund was among the highest-ranking stock funds throughout Mr. Lynch’s tenure, which began in 1977 at the fund’s launching, and ended in 1990, when Mr. Lynch retired.

Peter Lynch’s approach is strictly bottom-up, with selection from among companies with which the investor is familiar, and then through fundamental analysis that emphasizes a thorough understanding of the company, its prospects, its competitive environment, and whether the stock can be purchased at a reasonable price. His basic strategy is detailed in his best-selling book "One Up on Wall Street" [Penguin Books paperback, 1989], which provides individual investors with numerous guidelines for adapting and implementing his approach. His most recent book, "Beating the Street" [Fireside/Simon & Schuster paperback, 1994], amplifies the theme of his first book, providing examples of his approach to specific companies and industries in which he has invested. These are the primary sources for this article.

The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know

Lynch is a "story" investor. That is, each stock selection is based on a well-grounded expectation concerning the firm’s growth prospects. The expectations are derived from the company’s "story"--what it is that the company is going to do, or what it is that is going to happen, to bring about the desired results.

The more familiar you are with a company, and the better you understand its business and competitive environment, the better your chances of finding a good "story" that will actually come true. For this reason, Lynch is a strong advocate of investing in companies with which one is familiar, or whose products or services are relatively easy to understand. Thus, Lynch says he would rather invest in "pantyhose rather than communications satellites," and "motel chains rather than fiber optics."

Lynch does not believe in restricting investments to any one type of stock. His "story" approach, in fact, suggests the opposite, with investments in firms with various reasons for favorable expectations. In general, however, he tends to favor small, moderately fast-growing companies that can be bought at a reasonable price.

Selection Process

Lynch’s bottom-up approach means that prospective stocks must be picked one-by-one and then thoroughly investigated--there is no formula or screen that will produce a list of prospective "good stories." Instead, Lynch suggests that investors keep alert for possibilities based on their own experiences--for instance, within their own business or trade, or as consumers of products.

The next step is to familiarize yourself thoroughly with the company so that you can form reasonable expectations concerning the future. However, Lynch does not believe that investors can predict actual growth rates, and he is skeptical of analysts’ earnings estimates.

Instead, he suggests that you examine the company’s plans--how does it intend to increase its earnings, and how are those intentions actually being fulfilled? Lynch points out five ways in which a company can increase earnings: It can reduce costs; raise prices; expand into new markets; sell more in old markets; or revitalize, close, or sell a losing operation. The company’s plan to increase earnings and its ability to fulfill that plan are its"story," and the more familiar you are with the firm or industry, the better edge you have in evaluating the company’s plan, abilities, and any potential pitfalls.

Categorizing a company, according to Lynch, can help you develop the "story" line, and thus come up with reasonable expectations. He suggests first categorizing a company by size. Large companies cannot be expected to grow as quickly as smaller companies.

Next, he suggests categorizing a company by "story" type, and he identifies six:

• Slow Growers: Large and aging companies expected to grow only slightly faster than the U.S. economy as a whole, but often paying large regular dividends. These are not among his favorites.

• Stalwarts: Large companies that are still able to grow, with annual earnings growth rates of around 10% to 12%; examples include Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Bristol-Myers. If purchased at a good price, Lynch says he expects good but not enormous returns--certainly no more than 50% in two years and possibly less. Lynch suggests rotating among the companies, selling when moderate gains are reached, and repeating the process with others that haven’t yet appreciated. These firms also offer downside protection during recessions.

• Fast-Growers: Small, aggressive new firms with annual earnings growth of 20% to 25% a year. These do not have to be in fast-growing industries, and in fact Lynch prefers those that are not. Fast-growers are among Lynch’s favorites, and he says that an investor’s biggest gains will come from this type of stock. However, they also carry considerable risk.

• Cyclicals: Companies in which sales and profits tend to rise and fall in somewhat predictable patterns based on the economic cycle; examples include companies in the auto industry, airlines and steel. Lynch warns that these firms can be mistaken for stalwarts by inexperienced investors, but share prices of cyclicals can drop dramatically during hard times. Thus, timing is crucial when investing in these firms, and Lynch says that investors must learn to detect the early signs that business is starting to turn down.

• Turnarounds: Companies that have been battered down or depressed--Lynch calls these "no-growers"; his examples include Chrysler, Penn Central and General Public Utilities (owner of Three Mile Island). The stocks of successful turnarounds can move back up quickly, and Lynch points out that of all the categories, these upturns are least related to the general market.

• Asset opportunities: Companies that have assets that Wall Street analysts and others have overlooked. Lynch points to several general areas where asset plays can often be found--metals and oil, newspapers and TV stations, and patented drugs. However, finding these hidden assets requires a real working knowledge of the company that owns the assets, and Lynch points out that within this category, the "local" edge--your own knowledge and experience--can be used to greatest advantage.

Selection Criteria

Analysis is central to Lynch’s approach. In examining a company, he is seeking to understand the firm’s business and prospects, including any competitive advantages, and evaluate any potential pitfalls that may prevent the favorable "story" from occurring. In addition, an investor cannot make a profit if the story has a happy ending but the stock was purchased at a too-high price. For that reason, he also seeks to determine reasonable value.

Here are some of the key numbers Lynch suggests investors examine:

Year-by-year earnings: The historical record of earnings should be examined for stability and consistency. Stock prices cannot deviate long from the level of earnings, so the pattern of earnings growth will help reveal the stability and strength of the company. Ideally, earnings should move up consistently.

Earnings growth: The growth rate of earnings should fit with the firm’s "story"--fast-growers should have higher growth rates than slow-growers. Extremely high levels of earnings growth rates are not sustainable, but continued high growth may be factored into the price. A high level of growth for a company and industry will attract a great deal of attention from both investors, who bid up the stock, and competitors, who provide a more difficult business environment.

The price-earnings ratio: The earnings potential of a company is a primary determinant of company value, but at times the market may get ahead of itself and overprice a stock. The price-earnings ratio helps you keep your perspective, by comparing the current price to most recently reported earnings. Stocks with good prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios than stocks with poor prospects.

The price-earnings ratio relative to its historical average: Studying the pattern of price-earnings ratios over a period of several years should reveal a level that is "normal" for the company. This should help you avoid buying into a stock if the price gets ahead of the earnings, or sends an early warning that it may be time to take some profits in a stock you own.

The price-earnings ratio relative to the industry average: Comparing a company’s price-earnings ratio to the industry’s may help reveal if the company is a bargain. At a minimum, it leads to questions as to why the company is priced differently--is it a poor performer in the industry, or is it just neglected?

The price-earnings ratio relative to its earnings growth rate: Companies with better prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios, but the ratio between the two can reveal bargains or overvaluations. A price-earnings ratio of half the level of historical earnings growth is considered attractive, while relative ratios above 2.0 are unattractive. For dividend-paying stocks, Lynch refines this measure by adding the dividend yield to the earnings growth [in other words, the price-earnings ratio divided by the sum of the earnings growth rate and dividend yield]. With this modified technique, ratios above 1.0 are considered poor, while ratios below 0.5 are considered attractive.

Ratio of debt to equity : How much debt is on the balance sheet? A strong balance sheet provides maneuvering room as the company expands or experiences trouble. Lynch is especially wary of bank debt, which can usually be called in by the bank on demand.

Net cash per share: Net cash per share is calculated by adding the level of cash and cash equivalents, subtracting long-term debt, and dividing the result by the number of shares outstanding. High levels provide a support for the stock price and indicate financial strength.

Dividends & payout ratio: Dividends are usually paid by the larger companies, and Lynch tends to prefer smaller growth firms. However, Lynch suggests that investors who prefer dividend-paying firms should seek firms with the ability to pay during recessions (indicated by a low percentage of earnings paid out as dividends), and companies that have a 20-year or 30-year record of regularly raising dividends.

Inventories: Are inventories piling up? This is a particularly important figure for cyclicals. Lynch notes that, for manufacturers or retailers, an inventory buildup is a bad sign, and a red flag is waving when inventories grow faster than sales. On the other hand, if a company is depressed, the first evidence of a turnaround is when inventories start to be depleted.

When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable. These include:

• The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company--Lynch likes these kinds of firms because their ugly duckling nature tends to be reflected in the share price, so good bargains often turn up. Examples he mentions include: Service Corporation International (a funeral home operator--depressing); and Waste Management (a toxic waste clean-up firm--disagreeable).

• The company is a spin-off--Lynch says these often receive little attention from Wall Street, and he suggests that investors check them out several months later to see if insiders are buying.

• The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry--Growth industries attract too much interest from investors (leading to high prices) and competitors.

• The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment or that would be difficult for a competitor to enter.

• The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad--such as drugs, soft drinks, and razor blades--More stable than companies whose product sales are less certain.

• The company is a user of technology--These companies can take advantage of technological advances, but don’t tend to have the high valuations of firms directly producing technology, such as computer firms.

• There is a low percentage of shares held by institutions, and there is low analyst coverage--Bargains can be found among firms neglected by Wall Street.

• Insiders are buying shares--A positive sign that insiders feel particularly confident about the firm’s prospects.

• The company is buying back shares--Buybacks become an issue once companies start to mature and have cash flow that exceeds their capital needs. Lynch prefers companies that buy their shares back over firms that choose to expand into unrelated businesses. The buyback will help to support the stock price and is usually performed when management feels share price is favorable.

Characteristics Lynch finds unfavorable are:

• Hot stocks in hot industries.
• Companies (particularly small firms) with big plans that have not yet been proven.
• Profitable companies engaged in diversifying acquisitions. Lynch terms these "diworseifications."
• Companies in which one customer accounts for 25% to 50% of their sales.

Portfolio Building and Monitoring

As portfolio manager of Magellan, Lynch held as many as 1,400 stocks at one time. Although he was successful in juggling this many stocks, he does point to significant problems of managing such a large number of stocks. Individual investors, of course, will get nowhere near that number, but he is wary of over-diversification just the same. There is no point in diversifying just for the sake of diversifying, he argues, particularly if it means less familiarity with the firms. Lynch says investors should own however many "exciting prospects" that they are able to uncover that pass all the tests of research. Lynch also suggests investing in several categories of stocks as a way of spreading the downside risk. On the other hand, Lynch warns against investment in a single stock.

Lynch is an advocate of maintaining a long-term commitment to the stock market. He does not favor market timing, and indeed feels that it is impossible to do so. But that doesn’t necessarily mean investors should hold onto a single stock forever. Instead, Lynch says investors should review their holdings every few months, rechecking the company "story" to see if anything has changed either with the unfolding of the story or with the share price. The key to knowing when to sell, he says, is knowing "why you bought it in the first place." Lynch says investors should sell if:

• The story has played out as expected and this is reflected in the price; for instance, the price of a stalwart has gone up as much as could be expected.
• Something in the story fails to unfold as expected or the story changes, or fundamentals deteriorate; for instance, a cyclical’s inventories start to build, or a smaller firm enters a new growth stage.

For Lynch, a price drop is an opportunity to buy more of a good prospect at cheaper prices. It is much harder, he says, to stick with a winning stock once the price goes up, particularly with fast-growers where the tendency is to sell too soon rather than too late. With these firms, he suggests holding on until it is clear the firm is entering a different growth stage.

Rather than simply selling a stock, Lynch suggests "rotation"--selling the company and replacing it with another company with a similar story, but better prospects. The rotation approach maintains the investor’s long-term commitment to the stock market, and keeps the focus on fundamental value.

Summing It Up

Lynch offers a practical approach that can be adapted by many different types of investors, from those emphasizing fast growth to those who prefer more stable, dividend-producing investments. His strategy involves considerable hands-on research, but his books provide lots of practical advice on what to look for in an individual firm, and how to view the market as a whole.

Lynch sums up stock investing and his outlook best:

"Frequent follies notwithstanding, I continue to be optimistic about America, Americans, and investing in general. When you invest in stocks, you have to have a basic faith in human nature, in capitalism, in the country at large, and in future prosperity in general. So far, nothing’s been strong enough to shake me out of it."

Summary of Peter Lynch Investing Secret :

Philosophy and style

Investment in companies in which there is a well-grounded expectation concerning the firm’s growth prospects and in which the stock can be bought at a reasonable price. A thorough understanding of the company and its competitive environment is the only "edge" investors have over other investors in finding reasonably valued stocks.

Universe of stocks

All listed and over-the-counter stocks-no restrictions.

Criteria for initial consideration

Select from industries and companies with which you are familiar and have an understanding of the factors that will move the stock price. Make sure you can articulate a prospective stock’s "story line"-the company’s plans for increasing growth and any other series of events that will help the firm-and make sure you understand and balance them against any potential pitfalls. Categorizing the stocks among six major "story" lines is helpful when evaluating prospective stocks. Specific factors depend on the firm’s "story," but these factors should be examined:

• Year-by-year earnings: Look for stability and consistency, and an upward trend.

• P/E relative to historical average: The price-earnings ratio should be in the lower range of its historical average.

• P/E relative to industry average: The price-earnings ratio should be below the industry average.

• P/E relative to earnings growth rate: A price-earnings ratio of half the level of historical earnings growth is attractive; relative ratios above 2.0 are unattractive. For dividend-paying stocks, use the price-earnings ratio divided by the sum of the earnings growth rate and dividend yield-ratios below 0.5 are attractive, ratios above 1.0 are poor.

• Debt-equity ratio: The company’s balance sheet should be strong, with low levels of debt relative to equity financing, and be particularly wary of high levels of bank debt.

• Net cash per share: The net cash per share relative to share price should be high.

• Dividends and payout ratio: For investors seeking dividend-paying firms, look for a low payout ratio (earnings per share divided by dividends per share) and long records (20 to 30 years) of regularly raising dividends.

• Inventories: Particularly important for cyclicals, inventories that are piling up are a warning flag, particularly if growing faster than sales.

Other favorable characteristics

• The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company.

• The company is a spin-off.

• The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry.

• The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment.

• The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad.

• The company can take advantages of technological advances, but is not a direct producer of technology.

• The is a low percentage of shares held by institutions and there is low analyst coverage.

• Insiders are buying shares.

• The company is buying back shares.

Unfavorable characteristics

• Hot stocks in hot industries.

• Companies (particularly small firms) with big plans that have not yet been proven.

• Profitable companies engaged in diversifying acquisitions. Lynch terms these "diworseifications."

• Companies in which one customer accounts for 25% to 50% of their sales.

Stock monitoring and when to sell

• Do not diversify simply to diversify, particularly if it means less familiarity with the firms. Invest in whatever number of firms is large enough to still allow you to fully research and understand each firm. Invest in several categories of stock for diversification.

• Review holdings every few months, rechecking the company "story" to see if anything has changed. Sell if the "story" has played out as expected or something in the story fails to unfold as expected or fundamentals deteriorate.

• Price drops usually should be viewed as an opportunity to buy more of a good prospect at cheaper prices.

• Consider "rotation"-selling played-out stocks with stocks with a similar story, but better prospects. Maintain a long-term commitment to the stock market and focus on relative fundamental values.

http://www.csulb.edu/~pammerma/fin382/screener/lynch.htm

The Gold/Silver Ratio Is Misleading

04/09/2011 By Ryan Jordan

Many traders, speculators, and investors focus on the gold/silver price ratio in determining which metal is under or overvalued. In recent weeks and months the ratio has collapsed from above 65:1, down to a current low of around 36:1. Throughout the twentieth century, the gold/silver price ratio went to nearly 100:1, occasionally dipped below 30:1, and only briefly hit a ratio of 17:1 in 1980. But few seem to question how misleading this ratio may be, let alone question why the ratio matters for a monetary system that (for the time being at least) is no longer based on gold and silver.
Gold/Silver Ratio as a Relic from Bygone (for now) Monetary System

First off, a quick review of where the interest in the gold/silver ratio comes from. When governments and their people used gold and silver as a medium of exchange, the official mint would dictate at what ratio they would coin gold and silver. In the case of the “American Act for Establishing a Mint” in 1792, all private persons had the right to have bullion coined at “the legal ratios.” The ratio was set by the U.S. government under the direction of the Secretary of Treasury Alexander Hamilton at 15 ounces of silver for every one ounce of gold, often expressed as a gold/silver ratio of 15:1. This relative value had been present in Europe more or less since the late 1500s, when large amounts of silver had flooded into Europe from the huge discoveries made by Spain in Mexico and Peru (which are still the two largest sources of silver today.) This ratio was supposed to be a reflection of the commercial value of gold and silver on the market in Europe—or the proportional value of the two metals in western trade. The European gold/silver ratio of 15:1 was much higher in gold’s favor than in India, parts of Africa, or East Asia, where gold/silver ratios were reported (in isolated cases) as low as 1:1, and generally stayed well below 10:1. Of course, the fixed Anglo-European ratio got out of whack with the market ratio, which is part of the problem with fixed bimetallic systems, but that is another story.
Gold/Silver Price Ratio Is Distorted by Government Bias against Silver

Over the course of the nineteenth century, for various reasons, gold was increasingly favored first by European nations, then by the United States, supposedly as a more stable monetary asset due to its rarity. The prejudice in favor of gold and against silver was due to many reasons, but the bottom line is that silver began to be demonetized in the late 19th century. This demonetization only accelerated throughout the twentieth century as countries from China to the U.S banished their silver from currency circulation. It also did not help matters that huge new discoveries of silver in places like the American West dumped ever more silver on the market. Yet without governments getting rid of silver stockpiles, or refusing to coin new silver bullion at the mint, the monetary demand for silver would not have dropped to as great a degree as it did. Governments took part in a campaign to demolish the monetary value of silver, really, and this cultural legacy has left its scars on the importance of silver as an investment. By the early twentieth century, the value of silver was nearing 100 ounces to 1 ounce of gold, the lowest in history. Yet, the mine production of silver was not 100 times that of gold, nor was the relative abundance of silver money 100 times that of gold.

You should note, then, that the prejudice of the official sector (governments and mints) in the US and Europe has played a factor in the widening of the gold/silver ratio away from 15 to 1, to anywhere from 35: 1 up to 100:1. The dumping of silver on the market by government continued right up until a few years ago. Between 1965 and 2000 governments sold over 3 billion ounces of silver, versus roughly 150 million ounces of gold over the same time period. Moreover, another billion or so ounces of silver was consumed by industry, as opposed to private gold stockpiles actually increasing. The official sector, beginning in late 2009, has begun to buy back some of this gold. They have not begun to do the same with silver. Should we be wondering when they might start?

Keeping with the issue of official sales, governments at present only hold at most 60 million ounces of silver, as compared with 1 billion ounces of gold. Among those who run our world, silver is now far rarer than gold.
With Silver, the Ants (Investors) Will Carry Away the Banks’ Picnic Basket

Given that the official sector can’t dump any more silver on the market, this dramatically increases the importance of the individual investor in the silver market. It means that the vast majority of silver bullion in the world is held by investors. This is quite different from the last silver bull market, where official exchanges and governments stood ready to release several hundred million ounces for consumption.

But just because average investors are the ones who hold most of the silver in the world, please do not take this to mean that there is widespread ownership of silver among retail investors! In fact, up until recently, most people who bought precious metals only bought gold. During the decade from 2000 to 2010, the dollar amounts invested in gold far outstripped those invested in silver. Yet in the past few months something has begun to change.

So far in 2011, dollar demand for Silver Eagles has been nearly equal to that of gold. Inflows into the iShares Silver Trust (SLV) have been greater than inflows into the GLD ETF, and Eric Sprott, of Sprott Asset management has similarly reported that investors are buying more silver from him in dollar terms than gold. Additionally, James Turk of GoldMoney is reporting silver sales near gold in dollar terms. These statements, like them or not, mean that in terms of investor interest the gold to silver ratio is 1 to 1. Since there is less silver above ground than gold, it really means that the gold to silver price ratio should be in silver’s favor.
Please Pay Attention to Gold/Silver Ratios in Terms Other Than Price

I understand if you think that this is a bunch of hyped BS from someone getting carried away with an asset that is dramatically outperforming nearly everything else in the investment universe at the moment. But remember, investment manias take on a life of their own, and when the human investing herd changes directions, you need to learn to get out of the way. I write this with old silver and goldbugs in mind, who perhaps understandably can’t believe the price action on an asset many have owned since it was under 4 dollars. I will address the various metrics for valuing silver today in a different article, but rest assured, with the amount of money printing or monetizing going on, silver may be as cheap today as it was when its price was 10 dollars. Hard to believe, but I think its true.

And at some point, more articles online may begin to quote other ratios between the precious metals. For example, about nine times as much silver as gold comes out of the ground each year, but the vast majority of this silver is used by industry, much of it destroyed. And miners, believe it or not, only believe that there is about 6 times as much silver in the ground that can be mined, according to the USGS. I have read or heard others claim that there is 15 or 20 times more silver in the Earth, but much of this may never, under any circumstance, be economical to mine (this ratio, in other words, is the natural occurrence ratio, not the reserve base ratio). In addition, you might think that producers will just be able to ramp up production in silver to increase the amount of silver bullion or coins to a level greater than gold. But this has not happened yet: the amount of new gold and silver bullion and coin production is not that far from 1:1, even if more silver is produced. And over the past decade, 35-40 times more silver was not earmarked for coins and bullion, which is what the price ratio of gold to silver would lead you to believe.

In short, if you are going to use gold/silver ratios, you may want to think about the possible relevance of other ratios:
9:1 is the ratio of silver to gold annual mine production
6:1 is the estimated ratio of economic gold to silver in the ground (USGS)
5:1 is the estimated physical ratio of all silverware, silver/gold jewelry and other stocks above ground (according to CPM Group)
1:1 is the year-to-date ratio of investment dollar demand.
1:3 (more silver than gold) is the physical ratio of gold and silver coins/bullion

These gold/silver ratios are not as familiar to traders, hedge fund managers, or the investing public. But I think that someday in the not so distant future they will be.

Peak Gold

Most have heard about Peak Oil – the proposition that world oil production has peaked and is in terminal decline. Now, Peak Gold is being proclaimed by industry experts. Vincent Borg, spokesman for the world’s biggest gold producer Barrick Gold, says gold production has been in decline since 2001. Total gold production peaked at 2,600 tonnes per year around 2000. The reason gold production has peaked is that existing mines are being depleted and new discoveries are few and small. Also, it takes many years to bring a resource discovery into production.

Demand, on the other hand, has increased to 3,800 tonnes in 2009 according to the World Gold Council. Over the decade from 1999 to 2009 central banks have sold 3,867 tonnes of their gold under various Central Bank Gold Agreements. These agreements have now ended and no more central bank selling is planned. Even with central bank selling the gold price has increased well over 200% since 1999. During the last several years a number of Gold Exchange Traded Funds have appeared. These are funds that sell shares to investors that track the price of gold. These funds must purchase and hold physical gold to back the shares. Currently these funds hold 2,000 tonnes of gold and represent a major new source of demand. The financial crisis that began in 2007 adds other demands as large institutional investors that have never owned gold before move into the market. New small investors are attracted to buy into the funds, coins and jewellery.

It appears that Peak Gold is real. Given the current climate – the gold price has only one way to go.

An interesting fact: The total amount of gold ever produced will fill a little more than 3 Olympic-size swimming pools. Here is the calculation. The World Gold Council estimates 163,000 tonnes of gold exists above ground today. That is 163,000,000 kg. The density of gold is 19,300 kg per cubic meter. Dividing 163,000,000 kg by 19,300 kg per cubic meter gives 8456 cubic meters as the volume of all the gold in existence. The volume of an Olympic-size swimming pool is 2,500 cubic meters (50 m by 25 m by 2 m). Dividing 8456 cubic meters by 2,500 cubic meters give 3.34 Olympic-size swimming pools as the volume of the gold in the world.

(Saturday, November 28, 2009 - http://gold.goldprice.org/2009/11/peak-gold.html)

家婆无谓挑剔媳妇(201004)

四月 2nd, 2010 by 曹仁超

4月1日，周四。复活节假期将至，除了假期版外，‘投资者笔记’将会在假期后下周三刊登，请各位读者留意。

许多基础分析投资者对近期各国央行滥发货币存有戒心，担心恶性通胀重临。这种心理，我老曹十分理解，但我老曹认为，这次刺激政策只会带来资产价格上 升（例 如商品、黄金、石油以至楼价），但不会引发恶性通胀，亦不会出现类似日式通缩，因为没有一个国家愿意将本国货币大幅升值200％（1985至94年日圆除外）。或者可以说，我们已重新进入滞胀期，类似1966至71年美国。短期而言，市场对主权债券违约的忧虑下降，私人银行将取代中央银行成为债券大买家。 中国政府为冷却GDP高速增长（10％或以上），进一步抽紧银根难免，令Ａ股短期仍难大升，但目前已在蓄势中，各位可利用这段日子吸纳更多国企、红筹及内房股。我们正进入低通胀、低GDP增长的时代，只有个别股份能有出色表现，其余皆进入牛皮市。‘发达容易，揾食艰难’日子重临也！

楼价极受政策影响

Follow the market, and keep a close eye on your stocks。上述投资法正取代价值投资法。葛拉罕的著作Security Analysis在1934年出版，至今已卖出超过一百万册。另一本较浅显的The Intelligent Investor在1949年出版，而毕非德在1950年毕业，那段日子大部分美股仍十分便宜。不过，踏入2000年，过去十年内有五年平均P/E超过四十倍，在如此高P/E环境下再用价值投资法，成绩难以理想（过去十年道指并没有多少升幅）。2010年起美国在如此高负债下，前景令人担心。1960年代 美国每增加1美元新贷款，可令GDP增加1美元；但到2009年，每增加1美元新贷款，对GDP已无甚影响。美国到了负债饱和点（debt saturation），即美国政府已不能透过增加负债去刺激GDP增长，情况同1990年起的日本相似。过去一百年，美国楼价大部分日子升幅只是略高于通胀，只有1996至2006年楼价才狂升，然后泡沫爆破。

如参考德国例子，楼价上升并非必然。从1977年至今，德国房价平均只上升60％，同期人均收入上升三倍，即德国房价平均每年只上涨1％。2006及07 年我老曹出售在英国的住房投资，曾经打算投资德国柏林，2006年起便收集及研究该国资料：一、德国每年有二十五万套新公寓完工，是拥有最详尽建屋规划的国家之一。二、德国实行‘先存后贷’合同储蓄计划，即买楼者先存入楼价50％才获贷款，固定利率年期平均十一年半，即如你决定买楼，可以先行存款，直到存款相当于楼价50％便可买楼；存款是固定利率，贷款亦是固定利率，没有变化。三、只有42％家庭拥有自住物业，其余58％租楼（年轻人77％租楼），由于供应充足，楼价平均每年只升1％，置业只作为自住，不能博资产升值。四、可以‘自建房’及‘合作建房’，即一批人加起来向政府买地自行兴建，完成后‘分 楼’，又或一幢大厦业主合作将它重建然后‘分楼’。地产商所订楼价如超出‘合理房价20％’便构成违法行为，可告上法庭，不但罚款，而且负刑事责任。五、物业交易政府抽1％到1.5％不动产税、3.5％交易税；如有利润抽15％盈利税，租金收入抽25％利得税，房屋管理、维修费用由业主负责。

德国的楼市情况，证明楼价极受政策影响，而非其他因素。政府完全有能力阻止楼价上升（甚至推冧楼价，例如1997年特区政府的八万五房屋政策）；反之，政府却没有能力阻止楼价回落（例如日本）。反观股票市场，永远充满机会。http://www.caorenchao.com/373.html

美楼按息率势上调

2006年美国住房高潮至今，楼价已回落约30％。2007年下半年政府透过大幅减息制造虚假需求，去年3月更透过资金泛滥去支持楼价。虽然如此， 仍有五 百万间房屋被接管，而且有25％业主资不抵债，未来三至五年将再有五百万间房屋被接管。上述情况大大影响经济复苏速度，因为没有楼价支持的经济复苏并不长久。最近三个月，美国新屋及二手楼的销情又再慢下来，担心去年美国楼价回升的需求主要来自政府提供8000美元税务优惠，一旦停止，楼市回复死气沉沉。至于联储局购入按揭证券至今年3月底结束，估计4月1日后，楼按利率将上调。

政府鼓励市民置业是否良策？这在国际间已引起争论。过去日本政府一直鼓励置业，1990年超过70％日本家庭拥有自住物业，但过去二十年日本楼价下跌 70％，令日本人消费下降、企业投资减少。1997年8月香港小业主人数超过一百万，当楼价自1997年8月急跌至2003年7月，这一百万小业主亦怯于消费，令香港经济出现不景气。直至2003年7月中央政府批准内地人来港自由行消费，而且2003年9月特区政府推出‘孙九招’，用勾地表代替定期拍卖土 地，加上美股自2002年10月起上升、美元利率下降到只有1厘等因素加起来，本港楼价才止跌回升，至今升幅130％左右（豪宅升幅更达200％）。

负利率时代重临中国

在1914年前的英国金本位时代，英国年通胀率介乎负数到6％。1971年8月美国脱离金本位后，美国最高通胀率曾达14％，2008至09年则一度出现负数。经济学家认为，最佳的年通胀率是2％到4％。过去贝南奇曾订下目标通胀率2％，认为通胀率一旦低于2％对经济不利，一旦高于4％又担心通胀失控。

人行决定中国CPI升幅接近3％才加息。内地2月份CPI较去年同期上升2.7％，是十八个月内首次CPI升幅高于一年期存款利率，即负利率时代重临中国！情况有点类似2007年。内地2月份CPI升幅，其实有季节因素在内。受天气影响，中国通胀高潮估计在今年6、7月出现。换言之，人民币加息最大可能性在年中出现。

回顾1971年起美元同黄金脱钩后，七十年代危机是因为恶性通胀，引致1981年美元利率曾狂升至22厘；其后所有危机都同资产膨胀有关，而非同通货膨胀 （CPI大幅上升）有关。回看日本八十年代至今经济盛衰的成因：一、过分依赖出口市场去消化本身的过剩生产力；二、出口赚回来的钱变成储蓄而产生大量资 金，产生货币升值预期，吸引外资流入，推动本国资产价格上升而产生泡沫；三、泡沫爆破令人民消费下降，企业投资减少而引发衰退。

金管局新任总裁陈德霖在去年12月举办之‘香港经济峰会2010’中指出，近代社会最大风险不再是通胀，而是资产膨胀，例如1997年、2000 年、 2007年危机的产生，都同资产膨胀有关。1985年至1990年日本的情况告诉大家──货币升值与加息并不能阻止资产膨胀出现，抽紧银根则有点用，例如去年8月人行已开始抽紧银根，去年11月开始本港金管局亦从市场抽走资金，而美国今年4月1日开始加入。



任何事物都有循环周期，CPI亦不例外。1994年起日本是OECD中最先进入CPI稳定或回落期的国家，但2010年日本物价反较1994年那年低。 2008年起，美国同欧洲亦进入CPI稳定期，战后长达六十多年的西方国家CPI大升期结束，理由是大量银行倒闭，债券出现无法履行合约，例如通用汽车、 房利美、房贷美及不少大企业皆无法清还负债，令过千亿计美元资产突然消失。去年美国家庭负债较08年下跌1.7％，是1945年以来首次。去年第四季美国人储蓄率4％，估计将进一步上升。美国是否步入通缩期？

美国领导全球地位动摇

过去一百年是美国领导整个工业化国家的时代，最先是创新科技，1966年起是排山倒海的信贷扩张、美元泛滥全球，直到2007年次按危机爆发。 2009年 再一次美元泛滥，但这一次只能刺激全球股市上升。看来，美国领导全球工业国的地位已出现动摇，过去英、美两国消耗全球70％储蓄的时代亦开始结束。

如果你在1950年前后出生，恭喜你成为战后最受惠一代（尤其在香港生活，既没有战乱，亦没有天灾）。如果你在1970年前后出生，叫做‘X’一 代，你有 愉快童年及接受高深教育的机会，但到社会做事却灾难处处，包括1997年亚洲金融风暴、2000年科网股泡沫爆破、2007年次按危机。如果你在1990年前后出生，则面对香港人口老化问题及1950年前后出生一代步入退休期，愈来愈多港人超过六十五岁，香港高薪职位愈来愈少（2010年全港只有九万个年薪100万元或以上的职位），90年前后出生的你恐怕将成为‘迷失世代’。而1950年前后出生者，则正在研究退休后如何保护自己的财富。

沃尔玛前主席Sam Walton的成功，是找出如何将美国消费者由市区引向郊区；到今天，美国人已习惯到近郊的沃尔玛大包小包购物。1980年（当时沃尔玛已上市十年）如你投资1万美元在沃尔玛，三十年后今天市值高达350万美元，平均每年上升22％，理由是Sam Walton看到美国人消费习惯改变。同样情况，在1980年如你投资1万美元在Nike，今天市值100万美元。还有星巴克、FedEx、UPS、 eBay、Google……。

找出中国的明日之‘升’

连美国如此成熟的经济，发达机会仍然如此多，年轻的香港人怎么认为香港未来没有机会？只要找出一种新的处事方法，你便可能发展出中国的沃尔玛；找出 一种新的生活态度，你可能发展出中国的星巴克；又或者带来新的事业，例如中国的联邦快递、UPS、eBay、Google。顾客永远是皇帝，最重要是如何能更好地服务他们。例如Apple推出手机，令该股股价五年内上升435％。如你2002年7月投资Marvel，该公司日后竟能将漫画变成大电影，包括 Spiderman、X-Men、Iron Man，而投资5万美元在其身上，日后被迪士尼收购，将可收回81.4万美元，上升十五点三倍！今天的投资策略便是买入这类高增长股，然后睇住它日渐长大（万一事与愿违，便止蚀离场）！而不是买‘过气明星股’。投资是买未来，不是买过去。名气愈大的股份，愈没有投资价值。

据2009年美国统计数字，拥有财富超过10亿美元或以上的家庭，去年财产总值升54％；至于财富少于100万美元的家庭，去年财产总值只升5.8％。因拥有10亿美元或以上者主力投资股票，而财产不足100万美元者主力仍在自住物业，但去年美国住宅楼价续跌。资本主义制度虽令GDP增长率较社会主义快， 但最大受惠者一定是富人而非普通人。发达容易、揾食艰难。如果1986年3月13日微软上市时（当时每股21美元）买入一千股（21000美元），经过六次拆细，今天已拥有1400万美元财富，升值七百四十六倍；如在思科上市时投资10000美元，今天值992万美元；如在2004年5月投资Priceline.com，至今升值802％；如在2003年3月投资Quality Systems，至今升值1185％；2002年6月投资Marvel，至今升值1388％，还有Apple、eBay、腾讯、比亚迪……。

由1967年出社会做事开始，过去四十多年我老曹错过的发达机会较掌握到的更多。例如金价由35美元升至850美元、楼价由67元一呎升到12000元一 呎、恒生指数由100点（因1970年1月才有恒指）升上32000点；1999年油价由10美元一桶升上147美元……东莞地皮由1995年的3万元人民币一亩，升到今天300万元人民币一亩！在正确时刻正确地点做正确的事（Do the right thing, at the right place, in the right time！），便可发达！2007年10月亦有人透过抛空美国金融股，到2008年底在一年内赚进几十亿美元。换言之，任何时刻都有发达机会。今时今日一个大学生欲找一份月入12000元的工却十分困难，今天如此，十年前亦如此。四十多年前我老曹刚离开学校时，作为一位英文中学毕业生，欲找一份300元月薪的工，一样十分困难。

三十岁前属示威抗议主力

1970至99年，在六十七个国家中发生80％公民与政府冲击中，有60％示威人口都是三十岁或以下。上述数字证明不是‘80后’有问题，而是 ‘30岁前’有问题，即三十岁或以下的年轻人，无论在过去或现在、在什么国家，都是对社会现状不满的主力。‘50前后’一代在七十年代那时，何尝不是走上街头要求 ‘中文合法化、反贪污捉葛柏、支持元州仔渔民上岸、反对政府发展沙田新市镇……。’七十年代示威抗议的年轻一代，今天已成为香港建制派的中坚分子，反过来指摘‘80后’?!这情况有如‘婆媳问题’，做家婆的经常对儿子的老婆挑挑剔剔，做媳妇的亦对家婆看不顺眼；直到媳妇自己做了家婆后，又会对自己儿子的老婆同样挑剔。七十年代我们是青年，曾对社会现状不满而示威抗议。今天我们成为建制派的一分子，面对青年人对今天社会现状不满而示威，为何不同情他们，反而指摘他们？今天我们都做了别人的家婆，为何挑剔自己的媳妇？难道我们忘记了自己做人媳妇甚艰难的日子？

全球只有2％人口懂得如何建立财富，其余98％人口皆不擅理财，形成整个社会气氛对有钱人存有敌意。例如富人被政府抽最多的税，却成为政客经常攻击 的目标，连平民亦憎人富贵；经济下沉时，损失最大的亦是富人，但社会反认为富人应负担更多更多。财富招人妒，因此财不可露眼。千万不可夸富，保持低调乃最佳策略。财富累积慢如蜗牛，失去易如反掌。

Silver Shortage This Decade, Silver Will Be Worth More Than Gold

涨到一万美元我都不吃惊

2010-11-10

　　宋鸿兵写作《货币战争3》正处在最紧张的收尾阶段，不过当接到本刊采访要求后便欣然接受，他觉得在国际“货币战争”硝烟弥漫之时，确实有必要让读者更清楚认识到金银的价值，“不要 错过这辈子最大的投资机会”。同他写的书一样，宋鸿兵在采访中也是语出惊人，大有“别人笑我太疯癫，我笑别人看不穿”之势。

　　《钱经》：M 宋鸿兵：S

　　M：最近各国货币竞相贬值，黄金价格连续上涨，这场的场景在您的书中曾出现过，您怎么看待未来黄金的走势？

　　S：我在第一本书《货币战争》中就推荐了黄金和白银这两种投资品，当时遭到很多人的嘲笑，认为这好像老农民在一个坛子里放几块金条然后埋在土里的做法。那时候黄金每盎司才400多美元， 现在已经突破1300。

　　为什么我看好黄金？因为我知道现行的这套货币体系要出问题了，美元将发生危机。美国一印钞票，黄金必然涨。现在危机似乎已经结束，黄金为什么还屡创新高呢？我认为危机没有结束，美国 整个负债占GDP的比重依然非常高。接下来的政策就是第三轮、第四轮定量宽松货币政策。每次印钞票，黄金都会达到历史新高。美国哈佛大学一个教授提出黄金可能涨到每盎司10000美元，在我看来 这是完全可能的，这不是信口胡说。

　　M：10000美元！太难以想象了吧？

　　S：大家一定要摆脱传统思维的束缚。

　　为什么可能涨到10000美元？美国最大的问题是高负债，在美联储的资产负债表里，国债的数量太大了，以至于全世界都在怀疑美国还有没有信用。早在上世纪90年代中期，就曾提出来有一个办 法可以让资产负债表大幅度的平缓，即让美国的黄金储备暴涨。美国有全世界最多的黄金储备——8000多吨，现在是按每盎司42.22美元计价，并没有按市场价来算。在美联储的资产负债表里，黄金 价值只有160亿美元，是很小的一部分。但如果调整成1360美元，甚至让价格涨到10000美元，那么70%以上的基础货币发行得到黄金支撑。美元立刻就变得非常坚挺了。

　　黄金涨到10000美元并非没可能，这是美国的一个长远战略，因为当美元一步步衰落的时候，没其他路可走。

　　M：能详细解释一下如此运作的背后原理吗？

　　S：美国的黄金储备不属于美联储，而是属于财政部。当黄金涨价的时候，财政部可以用增值的黄金资产去置换国债。

　　美元的发行过程是这样的：美国政府不能直接印钞票，但可以发行国债，然后把国债交给美联储，美联储提供收据（钞票）。

　　这样在美联储的资产负债表上，国债成了它的资产，每年有利息收入，而负债方是发行的货币。货币扩张时美联储大量的吃进债券，吃进越多，印出来的钞票越多。美国国债已经占GDP的90%以上 ，第二轮定量宽松货币政策仍然是购入财政部债券和私营部门债券，再这样下去，债务将达到GDP的200%。谁还敢持有美国资产？谁还敢储备美元？如果2/3在海外的美元都回流美国，美国立刻就超级 通胀。

　　为了阻止这个结果，财政部可以放手黄金涨到10000美元，到美联储把国债资产置换出来，把黄金放在资产负债表同样的位置，资产负债表立刻会大幅改善。当美元信用已经不行的时候，就把黄 金重新货币化，这是金价继续上涨的隐含动力。置换国债这个过程意味着黄金成为货币供应量的一部分，每个美元背后有黄金支撑。黄金定价体系发生重大改变，不是在按供需来定价，直接变成了央 行资产，变成了主要的货币构成部分。

　　M：这种观点很新颖，但是别的国家会同意美国这么干吗？如此轻松的就把巨额债务一笔勾消了。

　　S：有什么不同意的，美国对黄金定价的调整不受任何制约。

　　打个比方，比如一个家庭，收藏着很多画，也能生产很多商品，像桌子椅子之类的，可以拿出去交易，很受欢迎。现在不生产桌子椅子了，为了表示还是个很有钱的家，这些画本来卖1000万人民 币，明天就估值一个亿。家庭总资产还是很多，但这些画不会拿出去交换。重新定价之后，这个家庭又变得有钱了，别人还得借钱给他，守着这么些资产，还担心我欠你钱吗？

　　美国在上世纪八、九十年代把黄金价格压得很低，就是不想让人意识到黄金是货币，否则谁还用美元呀。玩纸币多赚钱，美联储想发多少就发多少，加上黄金的套子，就不能随便发。当美元信用 崩溃，美国留着的8000吨黄金，就派上用场了。

　　当今世界的中央银行家是个圈子，和美联储这伙人组成超级精英俱乐部，左右全球资金、信用的流动。他们中已经没有像戴高乐那样的民族主义者，都支持金融全球化，其实就是结成了利益共同 体。谁还会反对美国这么干？这些人甚至都不代表本国的利益。

　　M：黄金具有货币属性，大家不否认这点。但现在人们都在用纸币，直接把黄金视为货币，恐怕还是很难接受。难道要重新回归到金本位？经济学家都说金本位会导致通货紧缩、经济萧条的。

　　S：你先思考这两个问题：钱是什么？什么是钱？

　　我们这一代人是被彻底洗脑的一代，至少在货币问题上是这样的。从1971年布雷顿森林体系解体后，开始不把黄金当作货币，但这40年其实只是对纸币的再一次试验，在历史长河里微不足道。而 历史证明，脱离黄金的纸币根本承担不起货币的职能，政府是不可信的，人性的贪婪是无法克服的。现在大家都觉得花花绿绿的钞票是理所当然的钱，黄金不是货币，你不觉得太奇怪了吗？

　　金本位导致经济萧条这种说法毫无根据，工业革命就发生在金本位时代。电脑降价、电视机降价，这算通货紧缩吧，这不是增加人们的财富吗？难道只有物价涨才意味着经济好？经济学家喜欢这 么说的原因可能有两个：一是屁股决定脑袋，通货膨胀对政府有利，可以征收铸币税。二是经济学家亦被洗脑，习惯用理论、有数学模型来分析问题。经济学、金融学是社会科学，里面包含着复杂的 人性，这就要从历史经验中找答案、在实践中摸索，不是凭空想出来的。

　　M：那到底钱是什么？什么是钱？

　　S：你们杂志中“钱是信用的符号”就总结得很好，美国政府没信用了，美元的货币职能就弱化了。黄金独特的物理特性，决定其蕴含着无法抹杀的信用度，不可能完全脱离于货币体系。

　　那什么是钱？钱有价值尺度和流通手段的功能。在一定区域内大家能普遍接受的、稀缺的、对生产生活重要的东西就具有货币属性。因为稀缺、重要，所以有价值；因为能普遍被接受，所以可流 通。通货膨胀时期，什么稀缺什么涨，纸币最多，所以跌。

　　2008年金融风暴以后的世界跟之前已经截然不同了，全世界的货币基础正在发生剧烈的动荡，我们称之为地震活跃期。美元主导的货币体系走向衰落，美元崩盘不是用一种纸币替代美元，很可能 是纸币的消亡。这会颠覆我们以前所有的理财观念，以及对钱、对财富的看法，我们是生活在这样一个动荡时代，这个时代又给那些对钱有深刻理解的人提供巨大的发财机会。

　　M：具体谈谈呢？还要买黄金？

　　S：还有白银，白银比黄金更具投资价值。黄金与白银曾经的历史比价是1：16，现在为1：60。白银比黄金更稀缺，工业用途更大。历史上，白银就是货币，无论在中国、美国、英国都一样。白 银在美国用到上世纪六十年代，这个历史传承和惯性是存在的。白银相比于历史价位偏差了四倍，显然是个价值洼地，未来上涨空间更大。

　　伦敦是实物白银最大交易市场，纽约是白银期货最大的市场。华尔街和金融城这一轴心在定白银价格。白银很可能是我们这辈子最大的投资机会，我更建议买实物白银。

　　来源：钱经 作者：张志峰

黄金涨到1万美元不是梦

2011-03-07

　　2007年，《货币战争》横空出世，这本书火了两个词——宋鸿兵和阴谋论。随后，宋鸿兵再添上一把火，推出《货币战争2：金权天下》。在这两本书中，欧美列强争霸，乃至世界经济大趋势，好像都逃不出金融家们的翻云覆雨手。2011年，《货币战争3：金融高边疆》趁势推出。这次，宋鸿兵把视线放到了中国，他说，百年近代史也是一场“货币战争”！

　　日前，宋鸿兵接受早报独家专访，从“金融高边疆”聊到“白银帝国”……

　　理论中国须重视“金融高边疆”战略

　　19世纪末，美国人马汉首先提出“制海权”概念，认为“控制海洋就是控制世界”。1921年，意大利人杜黑提出“制空权”的概念，认为“掌握制空权就是胜利”。时隔60年，美国陆军中将格雷厄姆又提出“制太空权”的“高边疆”理论，坚信“控制外层空间就可以称霸世界”。

　　基于此，宋鸿兵提出金融高边疆理论。“‘高边疆战略’是美国人最早提出来的，美国人说国家的边疆除了通常的陆地、海洋、天空之外，还应该包括外太空，这样的‘高边疆’就成了美国‘星球大战’计划的基石。”

　　反观中国，宋鸿兵分析说，早在抗战时期，根据地就开始了以“物资储备”发行货币的金融创新，“这种货币在完全没有金银外汇做储备的情况下，保持了币值和物价的稳定，这在当时世界普遍采用以黄金储备来发行货币的背景下，堪称惊世骇俗。我们的货币实践远比西方的货币理论更前卫”。

　　困境人民币监管清算方面缺乏部署

　　在《货币战争3：金融高边疆》中，宋鸿兵以金融角度梳理了中国现代史，得出“清帝国的败亡，金融先于军事”的结论。“鸦片贸易的首要战略目标是颠覆清帝国的货币体系，实际上是英国金本位与清帝国银本位之间的一场战略决战”。宋鸿兵认为，在丧失金融高边疆控制权的情况下，清帝国贸易定价等权逐步沦丧，不可避免地成为待宰羔羊。“经过两次世界大战，美国成了老大，它又开始布局符合美国利益的全球化，那么其他国家包括中国怎么办？对能源、原材料、市场的争夺越来越激烈，货币战争当然不可避免。”宋鸿兵指出，当前我们的困境在于，人民币监管清算迟迟未见所动。“美国的金融监控非常严格，任何一家银行与朝鲜、伊朗等国在世界任何一个角落发生交易，美国都能监控到并随即将其划入黑名单。而中国在这方面的部署却几乎为零，我们的企业只要离开中国，去任何地方进行金融博弈的每一分钟都在别国牢牢的监控之下。”“人民币的国际化，并非只是将货币放出海外这样简单，人民币出现在哪里，哪里就是货币当局监管的新边疆。”宋鸿兵说。对于时下热议的“人民币升值”，宋鸿兵直言不讳地说：“人民币升值就是美国直接抢我们的储蓄！”他解释说，当年日元对美元的汇率上涨，日本损失了大量的现金储备。

　　预测今天的1000万30年后只值几万

　　“未来十年，纸币将会大幅贬值，最有价值的投资应首选重金属。”宋鸿兵说：“假如你现在有1000万元人民币，你以为你就可以退休吗？如果你把这1000万存在银行里，10年后可能只相当于现在的200万；再过10年，可能只值几十万；再过10年，可能只有几万了，可见纸币贬值的速度有多快。”宋鸿兵说。

　　宋鸿兵认为，美国所启动的新一轮量化宽松政策终将以失败收场，其后果必将推动黄金价格继续走高。在他看来，未来黄金价格还有巨大的上涨空间。除继续关注黄金的投资潜力外，白银的重要投资价值也将逐步体现，有望为投资者带来惊人的回报。“世界货币要重回金本位，黄金的价格涨到一万美元是非常保守的数字。”宋鸿兵曾经在《货币战争》一书中指出，美元体系可能发生重大危机，并提出未来黄金可能会重新货币化。宋鸿兵认为，美国经济的根本问题在于负债率过高，负债增速远远超过了GDP增长的速度，而能够持续繁荣的动力来自于向其他国家低成本负债以推动资产价值。这个模式的核心在于资产价格要无限上涨，但最终会面临自己的债务越来越高，造成资金流断裂。“迎接我们的将是一个战国时代”。

　　白银或是这辈子最大的投资机会

　　记者：从《货币战争1》到《货币战争3》您谈论的最多的就是黄金与白银，您也一直推崇百姓进行这两种贵金属的投资，那么对于普通百姓而言，怎样投资黄金和白银才是最稳妥的呢？

　　宋鸿兵：最近，很多人做白银或者黄金的T+D业务赚了不少钱，但我觉得这个方式不适合普通的投资者，T+D业务说白了也就是一种股权投资而不是实物投资，对于普通投资者而言风险很大，我建议大家还是回归到实物投资上来，无论黄金还是白银，实物的风险比股权投资小得多，同时也能赚到钱。

　　记者：在实物黄金和实物白银两者当中，您推荐投资哪一种呢？

　　宋鸿兵：其实两个都不错。但白银很可能是我们这辈子最大的投资机会，我更建议买实物白银。黄金与白银曾经的历史比价是1：16，现在为1：60。白银比黄金更稀缺，工业用途更大。白银储备是黄金的五分之一，换句话说白银比黄金稀缺得多，从未来全世界的储量看，白银可开发的时间是12.3年。“如果黄金继续不断地上涨，白银会上涨得更快。届时，越来越多的人将会通过收购白银来补充市场空缺。

　　记者：目前很多城市都推出了房地产限购令，您怎么看未来的房地产投资？

　　宋鸿兵：我未来的投资不会再配置房地产。15年后，我们下一代面临的问题却是如何把房子卖掉。人口结构改变将左右未来房地产市场走向，届时，爷爷留下一套房子，外婆留下一套房子，爸妈留下一套房子，老丈人那还有一套房子，一对小夫妻将有四套房产，这将形成一个供大于求的市场。不过，15年后对于投资者而言也许那是一个太远的市场，所以近几年楼市仍存在短期的投资机会。

　　记者：目前成都市的远景规划是把成都打造成西部的金融中心，您怎么看？

　　宋鸿兵：成都市的这个设想是靠谱的。你看纽约、上海还是伦敦这些国际化的金融中心，说到底都是贸易中心，只有贸易发达，金融中心的设立才算有了根基。成都是整个西部的商业贸易中心是毋庸置疑的，有重庆、昆明、贵州、西安不可比拟的优势。金融的发展和贸易的繁荣是彼此都不可或缺的，因此，我看好成都的发展。