Tuesday, May 31, 2011

Gold Mining Stock Margins

By: Zeal_LLC    Sep 03, 2010



Gold mining is a tough business.  In the quest to meet growing global demand these miners are constantly barraged with challenge after challenge.  They are attacked by environmentalists, targets of governmental meddling, purveyors of a science that is not exact, and must always fight to renew their finite resources.
Gold miners are also at the mercy of fluctuating gold prices.  Prices can be radically different from when a mine initially commences development to when it pours its first gold years later.  Even on a month-to-month or week-to-week basis, miners can see material differences in their revenues based on what prices are doing.  But thankfully, this blitz of opposing forces proves worthwhile in a secular bull market.
With the price of gold going from an average of $272 in 2001 to $1165 in 2010, pulling gold from the ground has become a lot more alluring.  And the miners able to deliver gold to market at these record-high prices have seen huge increases in revenues.  So long as this revenue growth outpaces costs, these miners have had the potential for fast-growing margins and stellar profits.
And this potential for profits leverage is what makes the stocks of these miners so appealing to investors.  The venerable HUI gold-stock index is up a whopping 1155% from its 2001 low to its latest interim high for a reason.  Gold miners should be cashing in on a secular bull in their underlying metal.  But as always, there is much more than meets the eye in this wild and wacky industry.
Even though the miners are generating higher revenues, the challenges don’t go away.  In fact, there are even more challenges today than there were 10 years ago.  And prudent gold-stock traders must be aware of and understand these challenges in order to profit in this arena.
Over the years I’ve written a series of essays on gold-mining challenges, and one of the most transparent challenges is on the cost front.  As we’ve learned over the course of this bull, miners have really struggled to control costs.  And the hopes of only moderately-rising expenses are pure fantasy for most.
To really understand these costs across the industry and at an individual-company level, analysts and investors alike have a couple different options.  They can either meticulously dig in the financial statements and craft their own cost measures, or use a common metric that most miners offer as part of their headline performance data.  I prefer the easy option, and this “cash cost” metric indeed provides a high-level summary of the expense side of producing an ounce of gold.
Fortunately most miners submit to a canned format of calculating cash costs according to a standard (non-GAAP) implemented by the Gold Institute (GI) back in 1996.  Prior to this standard gold miners were very creative and non-uniform in how their expenses were presented to investors.  And while not all miners submit to today’s standard, or comply to a tee, the GI-coined “Production Cost Standard” has since become a relatively uniform metric across the industry.
According to this standard, total cash costs are calculated by adding cash operating costs (direct mining expenses, stripping and mine-development adjustments, third-party smelting/refining/transportation costs, and then adding back byproduct credits if applicable) to royalties and production taxes.  This number is then divided by total ounces produced to get a per-ounce figure.
Now bear in mind that cash costs are not the complete tell-all of a miner’s strategic health, future direction, or ability to generate cash flow.  But this standard performance measure does offer investors a pretty good idea of its interim financial standing.
Cash costs tallied across the greater complex also offer a read on how the industry is trending.  And thanks to a unique dataset that we painstakingly compile in-house here at Zeal, we can get this industry read.  With quarterly cash-cost figures cataloged for all the major gold stocks trading in North America since 2001, we are able to calculate average annual cash costs.  And with the average annual gold price thrown into the mix we are able to calculate gross margins.
For purposes of this analysis I used the simple average cash costs of the nearly two-dozen companies in our pool.  And since these companies collectively produce about half of the global mined supply of gold each year, I would say this is a fair representation of the industry as a whole.
Focusing on cash costs first, you can’t miss the upward trend over the course of gold’s bull.  It’s also hard to miss the change in slope just over halfway through this timeline.  Early on the miners were able to control costs for the most part.  In each of the first six years cash costs increased by an average of 8% per year, which is equivalent to about $15 per ounce per year.
Conditioning was among the main reasons for this early moderate rise in cash costs.  Over the entire decade of the 1990s the gold price averaged a ghastly-low $350, and the gold miners were forced to adapt.  And those miners that survived the ravenous secular bear preceding this bull were producing gold from mines with very favorable mineralization.  They learned to operate under lean cost structures.
But these somewhat-restrained rises in costs were smashed coming into 2007.  In the last four years cash costs have progressively blasted higher, increasing by an average of 22% per year, or about $75 per ounce per year.  At $554, 2010’s average cash costs are 214% higher than they were in 2001.  Even more astonishing is today’s cash costs are double 2001’s average gold price!
There are a number of reasons for this meteoric rise in cash costs.  And provocatively one of the biggest reasons is the rising gold price.  These historic highs are allowing miners to develop deposits that would not have been economical several years earlier.  And the newer mining operations that pull from lower grades and more complex ores are naturally going to have higher operating costs.  More and more of these higher-cost mines have come online in recent years, thus driving up industry cash costs.
And speaking of lower grades, this higher gold price affords the option of a sneaky system of selectivity that you won’t hear many executives openly discuss in their conference calls.  What is commonly referred to as “low-grading” is an opportune way to extend a mine’s life without compromising too much on the revenue front.  This of course only works in a rising-gold-price environment.
In simple terms, low-grading involves mixing and/or shifting the ore that is being mined.  Mixing is nothing more than intentional dilution.  Occasionally you’ll see miners mix higher-grade reserves with waste rock, tailings, or lower-grade ore in order to preserve the higher-grade stuff for later if gold prices are lower.  You’ll also see operators shift mining to lower-grade portions of a deposit, again to preserve the higher-grade material for future use.
These methods will obviously drive per-ounce costs higher since it costs the same to process a ton of ore regardless of the grade.  While investors aren’t usually keen on this strategy, it helps secure longevity in a business that is constantly fighting time.
Another major factor influencing these sharply-rising costs is energy-related expenditures.  From fueling a mining fleet to generating power in processing facilities, mining is an energy-intensive business.  Gold miners are therefore very sensitive to energy costs.  And with the price of oil going from $50 in early 2007 to nearly $150 in mid-2008, miners were indeed seeing their energy costs skyrocket.
Last but certainly not least of the major factors negatively impacting costs are the effects of byproduct credits.  Gold mineralization is often accompanied by other minerals, predominantly economic grades of copper, silver, lead, and zinc depending on the specific geological makeup of a given deposit.
As noted in the formula above, it is customary for gold miners to use the revenues from the sales of these byproduct metals to credit cash costs.  And with silver and the base metals enjoying huge bull markets of their own, these byproduct credits have had material impacts on gold’s net cash costs.  The higher the prices of these metals, the lower gold’s cash costs will be.  But if the prices of these metals decline, the resulting lower revenues make for less of a byproduct credit.  And this naturally leads to rising cash costs.
Interestingly all these major byproduct metals peaked and turned south around the same time cash costs started to balloon.  Zinc saw its high in Q4 2006, and even after a strong 2009 recovery it is still trading well less than half its high.  Lead saw its high in Q4 2007, with its subsequent price activity very similar to zinc’s.  Copper saw its first major high in Q2 2006, ground sideways for a couple years, and then got a huge panic haircut.  Even after a major recovery its price is still well below its 2006 high.  Silver saw its high in Q1 2008, and so far has been unable to challenge those levels again.  Overall this byproduct weakness over the last several years has indeed had an adverse affect on gold cash costs.
Ultimately with the cost of doing business rising at such an astronomical pace, you’d think this industry was broken and failure was imminent.  Not many businesses can withstand a more than double in unit costs over a short period of time and survive.  But thankfully gold mining is not your typical business.  Incredibly, thanks to the rising gold price these miners are seeing their margins as robust as they’ve ever been.
As you can see in this chart, increases in the average gold price have easily outpaced cash-cost increases.  With gold’s average price rising by 328% since 2001, well ahead of cash costs’ 214% rise, gross margins have actually improved.  Assuming the miners are selling their gold at spot, the price/cost spread has grown by over $500 per ounce since 2001.  And even with these sharply rising cash costs, a simple gross-margin calculation shows that business is doing just fine.
Gross margin is defined as the proportion of each dollar of revenue that the company retains as gross profit.  And with GMs over 50% each of the last 5 years, these miners should be in pretty good shape.  But of course there is more to what these raw GM numbers tell us.
Gross margins over 50% are certainly nothing to complain about, but with such sharply rising revenues shouldn’t we see consistent growth on the margin front?  We should, but we don’t.  Interestingly over gold’s entire bull market the vast majority of GM growth occurred over only two years, 2002 and 2006.  If you look closely you’ll notice two major stretches of flat GMs.  These stretches highlight the toll of rising cash costs.
Even though the average gold price was up 43% from 2002 to 2005, gross margins were flat.  And then from 2007 to current even though gold is up 67%, we again see no growth on the GM front.  Thanks to these rising cash costs, margins have just not opened up as one would expect with gold achieving record highs.
It is also important to keep in mind that “gross” margins are indeed gross.  Not included in Gold Institute cash costs are depreciation, depletion, and amortization costs (DDA), along with reclamation and mine-closure costs.  These non-cash expenses, charges/credits for the capital investment that was made in the past, are tacked on to cash costs to create what the GI classifies as “Total Production Costs” (still non-GAAP).
These margins thin even more when we consider miners’ expenses outside of operating a mine.  Such endeavors as procuring mineral rights and exploration require significant capital.  And if economic grades of gold are actually found, developing a mining operation comes with an enormous price tag.  It can cost northwards of $1.0b just to build a decent-sized mine!
Since mining is inherently a risky and capital-intensive business, gold miners need higher margins in order to maintain and grow their pipelines.  Don’t let these robust gross margins have you believing that gold miners are swimming in cash.  This just isn’t the case considering non-cash opex and capital outflows on the exploration and development fronts.
As long as gold demand continues to rise, which it will, this industry will be faced with a lot of supply pressure.  And in order to handle this pressure the miners will need to continue to spend a lot of money to build out the necessary infrastructure to replace depleted mines and build additional mines at a fast-enough pace to meet demand.
Overall the gold price should continue to trend higher over the course of this bull based on its solid fundamentals.  But with more higher-cost mines coming online, cash costs are likely to continue to trend higher as well.  Thankfully this current cost-and-margin picture tells us that even though miners have yet to control costs, rising gold prices allow them to maintain margins that should allow for healthy financials.
So as investors we need to ask ourselves how these miners are managing their margins.  And we need to ask this question because many don’t do a good job of it.  You’d be amazed to find that a lot of gold miners with strong gross margins have unhealthy financials and future direction.  But the miners that do successfully manage their margins have and will continue to leverage gold’s gains, and thus greatly reward their shareholders.
Fortunately it is not too late to capitalize on the potential fortunes of owning gold-mining stocks.  As a group they still have a lot of room to run higher, in the near term and over the course of this bull.  In fact, most gold stocks are bargains at today’s prices.  The stock-panic overhang still has this sector well undervalued relative to its historical relationship with gold.  And even better, now is one of the seasonally strongest times to buy.
The bottom line is even though cash costs are on the rise, the sharply rising gold price allows gold miners to maintain strong margins.  But though these margins show the potential for legendary profits, they don’t tell the entire story considering the challenging business these miners are in.
These robust margins have and will make the stocks of these companies very attractive to investors.  And it is critical for these margins to remain high if the miners are going to have any chance of meeting gold’s growing demand.

Monday, May 23, 2011

中国银行业必将走向无可挽回的衰落

□ 陆磊 | 文
最近央行和银监会分别公布的两个数据值得高度关注。一是到2011年4月末,广义货币(M2)余额75.73万亿元,同比增长15.3%;二是到2011年3月末,银行业金融机构境内外合计本外币资产总额突破100万亿元,达101.2万亿元,比上年同期增长18.9%。
从横向看,中国的M2根据汇率折算约为11.55万亿美元,而美国同期的M2为8.98万亿美元,日本约为9.63万亿美元。中国已把美日两大经济体的货币量远远抛于身后,但中国的经济总量刚刚超越日本,只有美国的三分之一。从纵向看,如果银行业资产增幅仍保持当前17%-20%左右的速度的话,意味着不到四年时间内,银行业总资产还将翻一番。
这意味着什么?显然,只有两种可能性:一是银行业总资产价值的被动下行。通货膨胀、资产价格上涨即是对货币的第一次价值下行压力,而未来必将出现的人民币汇率贬值则是对以人民币标值资产的第二次价值下行压力。还有一种可能性是银行业总资产价值的主动下行,即来自央行的基础货币紧缩和商业银行贷款创造能力的下降,也就意味着实体经济部门从银行体系获得融资变得更难,资金体外循环的可能性上升,最终必然造成银行的重要性下降。
在当前经济局势下,货币和信贷无非紧或松两种选择,但都将无助于改变这一趋势的到来。
如果延续当前紧缩政策,首先被挤出的是实体经济新增融资需求。目前非国有部门贷款难,体现实体经济交易活跃度的票据融资持续负增长或低增长,而中长期贷款仍保持高位。而民间融资再度活跃,利率上升较快,进而吸引更多资金进入银行体系外的金融市场。数据显示,2011年4月银行体系人民币存款增加3377亿元,同比少增8325亿元。其中,住户存款净减少4678亿元。
在此趋势下,银行体系的衰落是可期的事件。首先,银行体系的存量市值可能出现较大调整。简单说,当前的问题不是银行现有资产能否持续保持高速增长,而是银行100万亿元总资产按外币(一种公允价值标准)、并进而按人民币是否仍然值那么多的问题。我们有理由作如下估计:第一步,资金体外循环保持扩大态势,银行体系低成本筹资、高价格放贷似乎仍可以确保体系性收益(存贷利差)保持高位,即在极短期间内,银行是安全的;第二步,由于银行业资产与实体经济脱节,实体部门不得不高成本筹资以饮鸩止渴,此时,银行看起来是安全的,但经济基础已经动摇;第三步,经济基础的动摇主要体现在汇率预期上,而外向型部门亦具有汇率稳定或贬值呼声,结果是人民币贬值、以外币计价的银行业总资产出现缩水;第四步,一旦人民币汇率回落,则固定资产的国内价格出现下降,银行业的优质资产出现向负面波动的可能,总资产以本币计价亦出现下滑态势。
第二,除非修改资本充足率规则,银行很难成为可持续的社会资金供应者。因为,即便不出现任何不良贷款,即便全部银行不吃不喝,所有的收入都用于补充核心资本,假设息差在4个百分点左右,而资本充足率保持8%,在未来四年中如果总资产翻番,就需要补充4万亿元附属资本。而如果紧缩周期下出现资产质量变化,银行体系更可能成为资本吸收的黑洞。
因此,基本可以确认,银行体系将进入一个总资产扩张的低增长期。没有什么资产是安全的,无论是对大企业融资还是有抵押品的资产。而风险管理的核心不是定价而是资本,从资本约束角度扩张资产比针对高风险资产实施利率上浮要有效得多,否则将是无度的再融资和不断松弛的风险管理。但即便如此,银行业的衰落和新型金融形式的出现,都将是不可避免的基本趋势。
作者为广东金融学院副院长

Wednesday, May 18, 2011

The Wisdom of Peter Lynch


  • Although it's easy to forget sometimes, a share is not a lottery ticket... it's part-ownership of a business.


  • Don't bottom fish.

  •  Everyone has the brainpower to follow the stock market. If you made it through fifth-grade math, you can do it.

  • Go for a business that any idiot can run - because sooner or later, any idiot probably is going to run it.

  • I don't go near the money and the money doesn't go near me.

  • I think you have to learn that there's a company behind every stock, and that there's only one real reason why stocks go up. Companies go from doing poorly to doing well or small companies grow to large companies.

  • I've found that when the market's going down and you buy funds wisely, at some point in the future you will be happy. You won't get there by reading 'Now is the time to buy.'

  • If all the economists in the world were laid end to end, it wouldn't be a bad thing.

  • Improved turnout will give parliament and government the appearance of being more legitimate.

  • It's human nature to keep doing something as long as it's pleasurable and you can succeed at it - which is why the world population continues to double every 40 years.

  • Suicide is a permanent solution to a temporary problem. Suicide is a choice and I think if we work with that with kids, we'll get somewhere.

  • The person that turns over the most rocks wins the game. And that's always been my philosophy.

  • When stocks are attractive, you buy them. Sure, they can go lower. I've bought stocks at $12 that went to $2, but then they later went to $30. You just don't know when you can find the bottom.

  • You get recessions, you have stock market declines. If you don't understand that's going to happen, then you're not ready, you won't do well in the markets.

  • There's no shame in losing money on a stock. Everybody does it. What is shameful is to hold on to a stock, or, worse, to buy more of it, when the fundamentals are deteriorating.

  • A person infatuated with measurement, who has his head stuck in the sand of the balance sheets, is not likely to succeed.

  • In business, competition is never as healthy as total domination.

  • Your investor's edge is not something you get from Wall Street experts. It's something you already have. You can outperform the experts if you use your edge by investing in companies or industries you already understand.

  • Owning stocks is like having children - don't get involved with more than you can handle.

  • If you can't find any companies that you think are attractive, put your money in the bank until you discover some.

  • A stock market decline is as routine as a January blizzard in Colorado. If you're prepared, it can't hurt you. A decline is a great opportunity to pick up the bargains left behind by investors who are fleeing the storm in panic.

  • There is always something to worry about. Avoid weekend thinking and ignore the latest dire predictions of the newscasters. Sell a stock because the company's fundamentals deteriorate, not because the sky is falling.






    

Peter Lynch Stock Selection Criteria

By Maria Crawford Scott

No modern-day investment "sage" is better known than Peter Lynch. Not only has his investment approach successfully passed the real-world performance test, but he strongly believes that individual investors have a distinct advantage over Wall Street and large money managers when using his approach. Individual investors, he feels, have more flexibility in following this basic approach because they are unencumbered by bureaucratic rules and short-term performance concerns.

Mr. Lynch developed his investment philosophy at Fidelity Management and Research, and gained his considerable fame managing Fidelity’s Magellan Fund. The fund was among the highest-ranking stock funds throughout Mr. Lynch’s tenure, which began in 1977 at the fund’s launching, and ended in 1990, when Mr. Lynch retired.

Peter Lynch’s approach is strictly bottom-up, with selection from among companies with which the investor is familiar, and then through fundamental analysis that emphasizes a thorough understanding of the company, its prospects, its competitive environment, and whether the stock can be purchased at a reasonable price. His basic strategy is detailed in his best-selling book "One Up on Wall Street" [Penguin Books paperback, 1989], which provides individual investors with numerous guidelines for adapting and implementing his approach. His most recent book, "Beating the Street" [Fireside/Simon & Schuster paperback, 1994], amplifies the theme of his first book, providing examples of his approach to specific companies and industries in which he has invested. These are the primary sources for this article.

The Philosophy: Invest in What You Know

Lynch is a "story" investor. That is, each stock selection is based on a well-grounded expectation concerning the firm’s growth prospects. The expectations are derived from the company’s "story"--what it is that the company is going to do, or what it is that is going to happen, to bring about the desired results.

The more familiar you are with a company, and the better you understand its business and competitive environment, the better your chances of finding a good "story" that will actually come true. For this reason, Lynch is a strong advocate of investing in companies with which one is familiar, or whose products or services are relatively easy to understand. Thus, Lynch says he would rather invest in "pantyhose rather than communications satellites," and "motel chains rather than fiber optics."

Lynch does not believe in restricting investments to any one type of stock. His "story" approach, in fact, suggests the opposite, with investments in firms with various reasons for favorable expectations. In general, however, he tends to favor small, moderately fast-growing companies that can be bought at a reasonable price.

Selection Process

Lynch’s bottom-up approach means that prospective stocks must be picked one-by-one and then thoroughly investigated--there is no formula or screen that will produce a list of prospective "good stories." Instead, Lynch suggests that investors keep alert for possibilities based on their own experiences--for instance, within their own business or trade, or as consumers of products.

The next step is to familiarize yourself thoroughly with the company so that you can form reasonable expectations concerning the future. However, Lynch does not believe that investors can predict actual growth rates, and he is skeptical of analysts’ earnings estimates.

Instead, he suggests that you examine the company’s plans--how does it intend to increase its earnings, and how are those intentions actually being fulfilled? Lynch points out five ways in which a company can increase earnings: It can reduce costs; raise prices; expand into new markets; sell more in old markets; or revitalize, close, or sell a losing operation. The company’s plan to increase earnings and its ability to fulfill that plan are its"story," and the more familiar you are with the firm or industry, the better edge you have in evaluating the company’s plan, abilities, and any potential pitfalls.

Categorizing a company, according to Lynch, can help you develop the "story" line, and thus come up with reasonable expectations. He suggests first categorizing a company by size. Large companies cannot be expected to grow as quickly as smaller companies.

Next, he suggests categorizing a company by "story" type, and he identifies six:
  • Slow Growers: Large and aging companies expected to grow only slightly faster than the U.S. economy as a whole, but often paying large regular dividends. These are not among his favorites.
  • Stalwarts: Large companies that are still able to grow, with annual earnings growth rates of around 10% to 12%; examples include Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble, and Bristol-Myers. If purchased at a good price, Lynch says he expects good but not enormous returns--certainly no more than 50% in two years and possibly less. Lynch suggests rotating among the companies, selling when moderate gains are reached, and repeating the process with others that haven’t yet appreciated. These firms also offer downside protection during recessions.
  • Fast-Growers: Small, aggressive new firms with annual earnings growth of 20% to 25% a year. These do not have to be in fast-growing industries, and in fact Lynch prefers those that are not. Fast-growers are among Lynch’s favorites, and he says that an investor’s biggest gains will come from this type of stock. However, they also carry considerable risk.
  • Cyclicals: Companies in which sales and profits tend to rise and fall in somewhat predictable patterns based on the economic cycle; examples include companies in the auto industry, airlines and steel. Lynch warns that these firms can be mistaken for stalwarts by inexperienced investors, but share prices of cyclicals can drop dramatically during hard times. Thus, timing is crucial when investing in these firms, and Lynch says that investors must learn to detect the early signs that business is starting to turn down.
  • Turnarounds: Companies that have been battered down or depressed--Lynch calls these "no-growers"; his examples include Chrysler, Penn Central and General Public Utilities (owner of Three Mile Island). The stocks of successful turnarounds can move back up quickly, and Lynch points out that of all the categories, these upturns are least related to the general market.
  • Asset opportunities: Companies that have assets that Wall Street analysts and others have overlooked. Lynch points to several general areas where asset plays can often be found--metals and oil, newspapers and TV stations, and patented drugs. However, finding these hidden assets requires a real working knowledge of the company that owns the assets, and Lynch points out that within this category, the "local" edge--your own knowledge and experience--can be used to greatest advantage.


Selection Criteria


Analysis is central to Lynch’s approach. In examining a company, he is seeking to understand the firm’s business and prospects, including any competitive advantages, and evaluate any potential pitfalls that may prevent the favorable "story" from occurring. In addition, an investor cannot make a profit if the story has a happy ending but the stock was purchased at a too-high price. For that reason, he also seeks to determine reasonable value.

Here are some of the key numbers Lynch suggests investors examine:

Year-by-year earnings: The historical record of earnings should be examined for stability and consistency. Stock prices cannot deviate long from the level of earnings, so the pattern of earnings growth will help reveal the stability and strength of the company. Ideally, earnings should move up consistently.

Earnings growth: The growth rate of earnings should fit with the firm’s "story"--fast-growers should have higher growth rates than slow-growers. Extremely high levels of earnings growth rates are not sustainable, but continued high growth may be factored into the price. A high level of growth for a company and industry will attract a great deal of attention from both investors, who bid up the stock, and competitors, who provide a more difficult business environment.

The price-earnings ratio: The earnings potential of a company is a primary determinant of company value, but at times the market may get ahead of itself and overprice a stock. The price-earnings ratio helps you keep your perspective, by comparing the current price to most recently reported earnings. Stocks with good prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios than stocks with poor prospects.

The price-earnings ratio relative to its historical average: Studying the pattern of price-earnings ratios over a period of several years should reveal a level that is "normal" for the company. This should help you avoid buying into a stock if the price gets ahead of the earnings, or sends an early warning that it may be time to take some profits in a stock you own.

The price-earnings ratio relative to the industry average: Comparing a company’s price-earnings ratio to the industry’s may help reveal if the company is a bargain. At a minimum, it leads to questions as to why the company is priced differently--is it a poor performer in the industry, or is it just neglected?

The price-earnings ratio relative to its earnings growth rate: Companies with better prospects should sell with higher price-earnings ratios, but the ratio between the two can reveal bargains or overvaluations. A price-earnings ratio of half the level of historical earnings growth is considered attractive, while relative ratios above 2.0 are unattractive. For dividend-paying stocks, Lynch refines this measure by adding the dividend yield to the earnings growth [in other words, the price-earnings ratio divided by the sum of the earnings growth rate and dividend yield]. With this modified technique, ratios above 1.0 are considered poor, while ratios below 0.5 are considered attractive.

Ratio of debt to equity : How much debt is on the balance sheet? A strong balance sheet provides maneuvering room as the company expands or experiences trouble. Lynch is especially wary of bank debt, which can usually be called in by the bank on demand.

Net cash per share: Net cash per share is calculated by adding the level of cash and cash equivalents, subtracting long-term debt, and dividing the result by the number of shares outstanding. High levels provide a support for the stock price and indicate financial strength.

Dividends & payout ratio: Dividends are usually paid by the larger companies, and Lynch tends to prefer smaller growth firms. However, Lynch suggests that investors who prefer dividend-paying firms should seek firms with the ability to pay during recessions (indicated by a low percentage of earnings paid out as dividends), and companies that have a 20-year or 30-year record of regularly raising dividends.

Inventories: Are inventories piling up? This is a particularly important figure for cyclicals. Lynch notes that, for manufacturers or retailers, an inventory buildup is a bad sign, and a red flag is waving when inventories grow faster than sales. On the other hand, if a company is depressed, the first evidence of a turnaround is when inventories start to be depleted.

When evaluating companies, there are certain characteristics that Lynch finds particularly favorable. These include:
  • The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company--Lynch likes these kinds of firms because their ugly duckling nature tends to be reflected in the share price, so good bargains often turn up. Examples he mentions include: Service Corporation International (a funeral home operator--depressing); and Waste Management (a toxic waste clean-up firm--disagreeable).
  • The company is a spin-off--Lynch says these often receive little attention from Wall Street, and he suggests that investors check them out several months later to see if insiders are buying.
  • The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry--Growth industries attract too much interest from investors (leading to high prices) and competitors.
  • The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment or that would be difficult for a competitor to enter.
  • The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad--such as drugs, soft drinks, and razor blades--More stable than companies whose product sales are less certain.
  • The company is a user of technology--These companies can take advantage of technological advances, but don’t tend to have the high valuations of firms directly producing technology, such as computer firms.
  • There is a low percentage of shares held by institutions, and there is low analyst coverage--Bargains can be found among firms neglected by Wall Street.
  • Insiders are buying shares--A positive sign that insiders feel particularly confident about the firm’s prospects.
  • The company is buying back shares--Buybacks become an issue once companies start to mature and have cash flow that exceeds their capital needs. Lynch prefers companies that buy their shares back over firms that choose to expand into unrelated businesses. The buyback will help to support the stock price and is usually performed when management feels share price is favorable.
Characteristics Lynch finds unfavorable are:
  • Hot stocks in hot industries.
  • Companies (particularly small firms) with big plans that have not yet been proven.
  • Profitable companies engaged in diversifying acquisitions. Lynch terms these "diworseifications."
  • Companies in which one customer accounts for 25% to 50% of their sales.


Portfolio Building and Monitoring


As portfolio manager of Magellan, Lynch held as many as 1,400 stocks at one time. Although he was successful in juggling this many stocks, he does point to significant problems of managing such a large number of stocks. Individual investors, of course, will get nowhere near that number, but he is wary of over-diversification just the same. There is no point in diversifying just for the sake of diversifying, he argues, particularly if it means less familiarity with the firms. Lynch says investors should own however many "exciting prospects" that they are able to uncover that pass all the tests of research. Lynch also suggests investing in several categories of stocks as a way of spreading the downside risk. On the other hand, Lynch warns against investment in a single stock.

Lynch is an advocate of maintaining a long-term commitment to the stock market. He does not favor market timing, and indeed feels that it is impossible to do so. But that doesn’t necessarily mean investors should hold onto a single stock forever. Instead, Lynch says investors should review their holdings every few months, rechecking the company "story" to see if anything has changed either with the unfolding of the story or with the share price. The key to knowing when to sell, he says, is knowing "why you bought it in the first place." Lynch says investors should sell if:
  • The story has played out as expected and this is reflected in the price; for instance, the price of a stalwart has gone up as much as could be expected.
  • Something in the story fails to unfold as expected or the story changes, or fundamentals deteriorate; for instance, a cyclical’s inventories start to build, or a smaller firm enters a new growth stage.
For Lynch, a price drop is an opportunity to buy more of a good prospect at cheaper prices. It is much harder, he says, to stick with a winning stock once the price goes up, particularly with fast-growers where the tendency is to sell too soon rather than too late. With these firms, he suggests holding on until it is clear the firm is entering a different growth stage.

Rather than simply selling a stock, Lynch suggests "rotation"--selling the company and replacing it with another company with a similar story, but better prospects. The rotation approach maintains the investor’s long-term commitment to the stock market, and keeps the focus on fundamental value.


Summing It Up

Lynch offers a practical approach that can be adapted by many different types of investors, from those emphasizing fast growth to those who prefer more stable, dividend-producing investments. His strategy involves considerable hands-on research, but his books provide lots of practical advice on what to look for in an individual firm, and how to view the market as a whole.

Lynch sums up stock investing and his outlook best:

"Frequent follies notwithstanding, I continue to be optimistic about America, Americans, and investing in general. When you invest in stocks, you have to have a basic faith in human nature, in capitalism, in the country at large, and in future prosperity in general. So far, nothing’s been strong enough to shake me out of it."


Summary of Peter Lynch Investing Secret :


Philosophy and style

Investment in companies in which there is a well-grounded expectation concerning the firm’s growth prospects and in which the stock can be bought at a reasonable price. A thorough understanding of the company and its competitive environment is the only "edge" investors have over other investors in finding reasonably valued stocks.

Universe of stocks

All listed and over-the-counter stocks-no restrictions.


Criteria for initial consideration

Select from industries and companies with which you are familiar and have an understanding of the factors that will move the stock price. Make sure you can articulate a prospective stock’s "story line"-the company’s plans for increasing growth and any other series of events that will help the firm-and make sure you understand and balance them against any potential pitfalls. Categorizing the stocks among six major "story" lines is helpful when evaluating prospective stocks. Specific factors depend on the firm’s "story," but these factors should be examined:
  • Year-by-year earnings: Look for stability and consistency, and an upward trend.
  • P/E relative to historical average: The price-earnings ratio should be in the lower range of its historical average.
  • P/E relative to industry average: The price-earnings ratio should be below the industry average.
  • P/E relative to earnings growth rate: A price-earnings ratio of half the level of historical earnings growth is attractive; relative ratios above 2.0 are unattractive. For dividend-paying stocks, use the price-earnings ratio divided by the sum of the earnings growth rate and dividend yield-ratios below 0.5 are attractive, ratios above 1.0 are poor.
  • Debt-equity ratio: The company’s balance sheet should be strong, with low levels of debt relative to equity financing, and be particularly wary of high levels of bank debt.
  • Net cash per share: The net cash per share relative to share price should be high.
  • Dividends and payout ratio: For investors seeking dividend-paying firms, look for a low payout ratio (earnings per share divided by dividends per share) and long records (20 to 30 years) of regularly raising dividends.
  • Inventories: Particularly important for cyclicals, inventories that are piling up are a warning flag, particularly if growing faster than sales.


Other favorable characteristics

  • The name is boring, the product or service is in a boring area, the company does something disagreeable or depressing, or there are rumors of something bad about the company.
  • The company is a spin-off.
  • The fast-growing company is in a no-growth industry.
  • The company is a niche firm controlling a market segment.
  • The company produces a product that people tend to keep buying during good times and bad.
  • The company can take advantages of technological advances, but is not a direct producer of technology.
  • The is a low percentage of shares held by institutions and there is low analyst coverage.
  • Insiders are buying shares.
  • The company is buying back shares.


Unfavorable characteristics

  • Hot stocks in hot industries.
  • Companies (particularly small firms) with big plans that have not yet been proven.
  • Profitable companies engaged in diversifying acquisitions. Lynch terms these "diworseifications."
  • Companies in which one customer accounts for 25% to 50% of their sales.


Stock monitoring and when to sell

  • Do not diversify simply to diversify, particularly if it means less familiarity with the firms. Invest in whatever number of firms is large enough to still allow you to fully research and understand each firm. Invest in several categories of stock for diversification.
  • Review holdings every few months, rechecking the company "story" to see if anything has changed. Sell if the "story" has played out as expected or something in the story fails to unfold as expected or fundamentals deteriorate.
  • Price drops usually should be viewed as an opportunity to buy more of a good prospect at cheaper prices.
  • Consider "rotation"-selling played-out stocks with stocks with a similar story, but better prospects. Maintain a long-term commitment to the stock market and focus on relative fundamental values.


    Tuesday, May 10, 2011

    Calculating The Value Of A Business – Part IV

    July 24, 2007 | Joe Ponzio

    By now, you have determined what your desired rate of return is. Personally, I like to use 15%. At that rate, my money will double approximately every 5 years. Why 15%? Considering that I have to find the companies, analyze them, say “no” to most of them, and patiently wait on the sidelines until an opportunity comes along, 15% is the minimum annual return I want to justify the work that I have put in.

    Let’s say that, like me, you want a 15% average annual return on your money. Let’s also assume that you would ideally like to hold your company for at least twenty years-assuming you could continue to earn 15% for all twenty years. If that’s the case, then we need to know what to pay today to earn 15% on tomorrow’s cash.

    The Future Cash

    The key to valuing a business is projecting, with a degree of accuracy, the future cash that a business can produce. Difficult? Yes. Most companies do not have steady, consistent operations that lend themselves to accurate, or comfortable, valuations. If the company’s operations are a roller coaster ride-up and down in an unpredictable cycle-it is nearly impossible to predict the future cash because there is no reason or data supporting your valuation.

    If, however, a business has consistently and steadily grown its owner earnings for a decade or more, and assuming the business has not recently undergone a radical change, then it is possible to have confidence in your predictions and value calculation. The more consistent the numbers have been, the more confidence you can have.

    What Is Consistency?

    Consistency is not a firm, annual yardstick by which we measure the success of a company. When we look for consistency, we should look less at the actual numbers, and more at a chart of that consistency. It is easy to look at a set of data and quickly deduce that there is no consistency. However, a chart will allow you to better visualize your company in a long-term timeframe without focusing on a single year’s performance.

    One need not look further than Buffett’s legendary purchase of Coca-Cola in 1988. At first glance, the owner earnings from 1978 through 1987 looked as inconsistent as they come, first dropping 14% from ’78 to ’79, then growing 100%, then 2%, 9%, 31%, 29%, -2%, 68%, and finally up 3% in 1987 from 1986′s level. Where’s the consistency? Look at the graph below to find it:

    The green line is the actual owner earnings. The black line is a trend line. Coca-Cola’s owner earnings were practically married to the straight trend line. Sure, they strayed a bit, but no company will be spot on. This is about as consistent as they come. What’s inconsistent you ask? Take a look at Campbell Soup below:

    Need I say more? Perhaps you can value and own this company. I don’t want to work that hard.

    Projecting Cash

    Okay-you know your company’s cash has been steady and predictable. Let’s say it has grown about 14% a year. To find that, of course, you’ve looked at multiple timeframes throughout the ten years. Let’s also say that your company had $10,000 of owner earnings in 2007. Based on its consistent past and operations, you may reasonably expect it to generate $11,400 (14% more) in 2008.

    Why can you say that? Though business is very fast paced, businesses move like snails. They usually do not grow consistently for ten years-and then change course on a dime. Nor do they often swing up and down, and then turn into “old reliable” in a year. If your business has been consistent, you can reasonably expect it to stay that way. As you check in on it in the future, if you find things to be otherwise, you can take the appropriate action (buy more, sell, or hold).

    Buying The Cash

    At the beginning of this discussion, we assumed a 15% growth rate. That means we can not buy the company’s $11,400 in excess cash for $11,400. We have to figure out what price we can pay today to earn 15% for one year and end up with $11,400. Fortunately, Excel® can do the leg work for us. To buy 2008′s $11,400, we can pay $9,913.04 today and earn 15%.

    Do the same thing for 2009 through 2015, growing the cash at 14% and then “discounting” it back to today at 15%. Then, for years 2016 through 2025, use a 5% growth rate in cash, and then discount it back at 15%. Add up all of your “discounted cash flows” and you’ll have the price at which you can buy the projected cash and earn 15% a year for 20 years.

    Add It Up

    You know the net worth. You have a reasonable expectation of the cash flows and you have a purchase price. Add them up. Now, you have a company value. Three questions remain:

    1. Is it a wonderful company?
    2. How confident am I in my valuation?
    3. How much money should I invest?

    Only you can answer those. And that, my friend, is how you value a business.

    http://www.fwallstreet.com/article/29-calculating-the-value-of-a-business-part-iv